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Summary 
Inaedificatio entails that movables that have been permanently attached to land 
through building cease to exist as independent things and become part of the land. 
Courts have adopted different approaches over time to investigate whether or not 
inaedificatio had occurred. It is sometimes said that courts have moved away from 
the so-called traditional approach, which focused on the objective factors, to the so-
called new approach, which places more emphasis on the subjective intention of the 
owner of the movables.  
This thesis analyses the applicable case law and concludes that there is 
inadequate proof of such a shift since both older cases associated with the traditional 
approach and later cases associated with the new approach emphasise the intention 
of the owner of the movables to establish whether accession had taken place. 
However, the case law does allow for a cautious different conclusion, namely that a 
certain line of both older and new cases emphasise the owner of the movable’s 
intention for commercial policy reasons, specifically to protect ownership of the 
movables in cases where ownership had been reserved in a credit sale contract.  
Constitutional analysis of these conclusions in view of the FNB methodology 
indicates that the courts’ decision to hold that accession had in fact occurred in 
cases that do involve permanent attachment of movables to land will generally 
establish deprivation of property for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution, but 
such deprivation would generally not be arbitrary since there would be sufficient 
reason for it. However, in cases where the courts decide that there was no accession 
because ownership of the movables had been reserved subject to a credit sale 
agreement, there is no deprivation of property because the landowner, who is the 
only one who might complain about the decision, could not prove a property interest 
for purposes of section 25(1). Moreover, the courts’ decision that accession had 
either occurred or not does not amount to expropriation under section 25(2) of the 
Constitution because there is no common law authority for expropriation.  
Therefore, the principal conclusion of the thesis is that the courts’ decision that 
accession had either occurred or not would generally be in line with the property 
clause of the Constitution.  
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Opsomming 
Inaedificatio behels dat roerende sake wat permanent deur bebouing aan grond 
vasgeheg is ophou bestaan as selfstandige sake en deel word van die grond. Die 
howe het in die verlede verskillende benaderings gevolg in hulle pogings om vas te 
stel of inaedificatio plaasgevind het. Daar word soms beweer dat die howe 
wegbeweeg het van die sogenaamde tradisionele benadering, wat op die objektiewe 
faktore gefokus het, na die sogenaamde nuwe benadering waarin die klem op die 
eienaar van die roerende goed se bedoeling val. 
Hierdie verhandeling analiseer die toepaslike regspraak en kom tot die 
gevolgtrekking dat daar onvoldoende bewys van so ‘n verskuiwing bestaan, 
aangesien sowel ouer sake wat met die tradisionele benadering geassosieer word 
en later regspraak wat die nuwe benadering sou volg klem op die eienaar van die 
roerende sake se bedoeling plaas. Die regspraak bied wel bewyse vir ‘n versigtige 
gevolgtrekking op ‘n ander punt, naamlik dat bepaalde ouer en later sake die eienaar 
van die roerende goed se bedoeling vir kommersiële beleidsredes beklemtoon, 
spesifiek in gevalle waar eiendomsreg in ‘n kredietkoop voorbehou is. 
Grondwetlike analise van hierdie gevolgtrekkings in die lig van die FNB-
metodologie suggereer dat die howe se beslissing dat aanhegting wel plaasgevind 
het in gevalle waar permanente aanhegting van roerende goed aan grond ter sprake 
was oor die algemeen ‘n ontneming van eiendom vir doeleindes van artikel 25(1) van 
die Grondwet sal daarstel, maar aangesien daar oor die algemeen voldoende rede 
vir die ontneming is sal dit nie arbitrêr wees nie. Aan die ander kant, waar die howe 
beslis dat daar geen aanhegting was nie omdat eiendomsreg van die roerende goed 
vir sekerheid onderhewig aan ‘n kredietkoop voorbehou is, is daar geen ontneming 
van eiendom nie omdat die grondeienaar, die enigste party wat beswaar teen die 
beslissing mag maak, nie ‘n eiendomsbelang vir doeleindes van artikel 25(1) kan 
bewys nie. Verder stel die howe se beslissing dat aanhegting óf plaasgevind het al 
dan nie in elk geval geen onteiening daar nie aangesien daar geen magtiging vir 
onteiening in die gemenereg bestaan nie. 
Die gevolgtrekking van die verhandeling is dat die howe se beslissing dat 
aanhegting óf plaasgevind het al dan nie oor die algemeen nie in stryd met die 
eiendomsbepaling in die Grondwet sal wees nie.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1 1 Introduction to the research problem 
Inaedificatio (also referred to as “building”) takes place, for example, when building 
materials, pumps, equipment or other objects and structures (being movable in 
nature) are attached or annexed permanently to land or other immovable property.1 
The general principle is that, when inaedificatio takes place, the movable property 
ceases to exist as an independent thing and there can be no separate right of 
ownership in respect of it.2 The previous owner of the movable therefore loses 
ownership when inaedificatio takes place, while the owner of the land is owner of 
everything permanently attached to the land.3 
However, it is often difficult to ascertain whether or not a movable thing has 
attached to land in such a way that inaedificatio has occurred in fact and in law.4 The 
court in Olivier v Haarhof & Company5 (“Olivier”) held that the decision as to whether 
or not inaedificatio had taken place depends on the circumstances of each case.6 In 
                                            
1
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 147. 
2
 CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 1
st
 reissue vol 27 (2002) para 
337; W Freedman “The test for inaedificatio: What role should the element of subjective intention 
play?” (2000) 117 SALJ 667-676 668. 
3
 CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 1
st
 reissue vol 27 (2002) para 
337. 
4
 Olivier v Haarhof & Company 1906 TS 497 501. See also I Knobel “Accession of movables to 
movables and inaedificatio – South Africa and some common law countries” (2011) 74 THRHR 296-
304 298; W Freedman “The test for inaedificatio: What role should the element of subjective intention 
play?” (2000) 117 SALJ 667-676 668. 
5
 1906 TS 497. 
6
 Olivier v Haarhof & Company 1906 TS 497 500; Macdonald Ltd v Radin NO and The Potchefstroom 
Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454; Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) 
Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A); Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 
986 (T) 998. See also PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property (5
th
 ed 2006) 147. 
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this case Innes CJ stated the criteria or factors to be considered to determine 
whether attachment had taken place as follows: 
“The points chiefly to be considered are the nature and objects of the structure[,] 
the way in which it is fixed, and the intention of the person who erected it.”7 
From this decision it has been deduced that there are three indications that 
attachment had taken place, namely the nature of the movable property; the manner 
of attachment; and the intention of the annexor. The first two have become known as 
the objective factors, while the intention is described as a subjective factor. 
The application of the three factors mentioned above, in particular the 
importance attached to the subjective factor, led to the development of three 
approaches for determining whether inaedificatio had occurred, namely the 
traditional approach, the omnibus approach and the new approach.8 Recent case 
law confirms that these three approaches exist.9 The court in Unimark Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd10 (“Unimark”) explained that the so-called 
traditional approach is mainly derived from Macdonald Ltd v Radin NO and The 
Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co.11 The court in Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd 
v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk12 held that the traditional approach does not take 
into account the subjective factor when the first two objective factors indicate that 
accession had occurred.13 The subjective factor only becomes relevant when the 
                                            
7
 Olivier v Haarhof & Company 1906 TS 497 500. 
8
 See 2 2 below. 
9
 Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A) 281; Unimark 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 986 (T) 998; De Beers Consolidated 
Mines Ltd v Ataqua Mining (Pty) Ltd [2007] ZAFSHC 74 (13 December 2007) para 25; Chevron South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd v Awaiz at 110 Drakensburg CC [2008] 1 All SA 557 (T) 568-569. 
10
 1999 (2) SA 986 (T) 998. 
11
 1915 AD 454. 
12
 1996 (3) SA 273 (A). 
13
 Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A) 281. 
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objective factors are inconclusive of whether accession has occurred. Accordingly, 
early case law is said to be associated with the traditional approach. The so-called 
omnibus approach featured in just one decision and can generally be disregarded for 
analytical purposes. 
The prevailing view is that case law, in particular post-1978 case law, is 
generally associated with the so-called new approach, which places greater 
emphasis on the subjective factor than the objective factors.14 The supposed shift 
from the traditional to the new approach has been the subject of debate and criticism 
by academic authors.15 The central issue in the debate is the priority that the new 
approach gives to the intention of the owner of the movable. For instance, it appears 
in case law that is associated with the new approach that the owner’s declared 
intention to retain ownership of the movable property is of paramount importance to 
determine whether accession had occurred, particularly in cases of instalment sale 
agreements.16 The owner’s professed intention that he or she withholds ownership of 
the movable property as a security interest in the event of failure by the purchaser to 
pay the full purchase price, plays the most important role. It has been argued that the 
new approach is contrary to the fundamental principles of the common law rule of 
inaedificatio as an original mode of acquiring ownership.17 
Recent case law18 and academic literature19 indicate that post-197820 case law 
shifted away from the traditional approach, which considers the objective factors as 
                                            
14
 Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 986 (T) 999. See also 
CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 1
st
 reissue vol 27 (2002) para 
338. 
15
 See 3 1 and 4 3 below. 
16
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W). 
17
 DL Carey Miller “Fixtures and auxiliary items: Are recent decisions blurring real rights and personal 
rights?” (1984) 101 SALJ 205-211 211. 
18
 Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A) 281; Unimark 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 986 (T) 998. 
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determinative, towards the so-called new approach, which emphasises the 
subjective factor when determining inaedificatio. This thesis analyses case law that 
is associated with the so-called traditional approach as well as the so-called new 
approach in an effort to determine whether such a shift had in fact taken place and, if 
it had, whether it would be justifiable. 
 
1 2 Research aims and hypotheses 
The aim of this study is to analyse and discuss case law that is associated with the 
traditional approach and the new approach to determine whether there really is a 
shift in case law from the traditional approach towards the so-called new approach 
when determining the occurrence of accession of movables to immovables. The 
hypothesis is that there possibly was a shift in case law from an approach that 
mostly considered the objective factors towards an approach where the role of the 
intention of the owner of the movable is elevated above the objective factors to 
protect the interests of the owner of the movable property, but that the existence of 
such a shift is clear only in the limited set of cases where the owner of the movables 
withholds ownership as a form of security pending payment of the full purchase price 
for the movables. 
This study also aims to discuss and analyse academic criticism against the so-
called new approach for the emphasis that it places on the subjective intention of the 
                                                                                                                                       
19
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 149; CG van der Merwe “The law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1980 ASSAL 
230-233 232-233. 
20
 Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd v Butcher Brothers Ltd 1978 (3) SA 682 (A); Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v 
Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W); Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm 
Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A); Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale 
(Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 986 (T); De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd v Ataqua Mining (Pty) Ltd [2007] 
ZAFSHC 74 (13 December 2007); Chevron South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Awaiz at 110 Drakensburg CC 
[2008] 1 All SA 557 (T). 
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owner of the movable. The hypothesis is that the new approach is criticised because 
it may be contrary to the publicity principle in that it focuses on the subjective 
intention of the owner of the movable.21 Moreover, the emphasis on the subjective 
intention of the owner of the movable could also confuse the rules of property law 
with those of contract law and may cloud the distinction between original and 
derivative modes of acquisition of ownership.22 
Finally, this study aims to discuss and assess the constitutional implications for 
a decision by the courts that accession had either taken place or that it had not taken 
place (the latter especially to protect ownership of the movable the ownership of 
which had been reserved for security reasons). The hypothesis is that a decision that 
accession had either taken place or that it had not taken place to protect ownership 
of the movable the ownership of which had been reserved for security reasons could 
constitute a deprivation of property. It is clear that if the court decides that accession 
had in fact taken place, the owner loses ownership of the movables because these 
objects cease to exist as independent objects if they become permanently attached 
to land. Moreover, where the court decides that accession has not occurred because 
the movable is subject to a credit sale with reservation of ownership, it might 
arguably amount to deprivation of a property interest of the landowner, who now 
“loses” the movables that were supposed to have become part of the land by 
accession. 
Accordingly, this study will subject the courts’ decision to decide either that 
accession had occurred or had not occurred to constitutional scrutiny. Therefore, 
                                            
21
 A Breitenbach “Reflection on inaedificatio” (1985) 48 THRHR 462-465 464; DL Carey Miller 
“Fixtures and auxiliary items: Are recent decisions blurring real rights and personal rights?” (1984) 
101 SALJ 205-211 207. 
22
 W Freedman “The test for inaedificatio: What role should the element of subjective intention play?” 
(2000) 117 SALJ 667-676 674. 
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deciding whether or not accession had in fact taken place (in the latter case to 
protect ownership of the movable the ownership of which had been reserved for 
security reasons) needs to comply with section 25 of the Constitution.23 Section 25 of 
the Constitution provides that “[n]o one may be deprived of property except in terms 
of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of 
property”. In First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South 
African Revenue Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v 
Minister of Finance,24 (“FNB”) the Constitutional Court held that a deprivation of 
property is arbitrary when there is insufficient reason for it or if it is procedurally 
unfair.25 Therefore, in the context of accession the question is whether there are 
sufficient reasons that justify the deprivation of the property concerned as a result of 
the court’s decision either that accession had taken place or that it had not taken 
place. Moreover, the court’s decision for holding that accession had or had not 
occurred may create an impression that an expropriation of property had taken 
place. This study will determine whether the court’s decision in accession cases can 
amount to expropriation, because if it does the expropriation would have to comply 
with section 25(2) and (3) of the Constitution.26 
 
1 3 Overview of the chapters and methodology 
This thesis consists of four chapters. Chapter one is the current introductory chapter. 
Chapter two provides an analysis of case law that is associated with the so-called 
                                            
23
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
24
 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
25
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
100. 
26
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, section 25(2) and (3). 
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traditional approach. As a point of departure, the chapter outlines a brief historical 
background of the general principles of the law regarding inaedificatio. The chapter 
also sets out the manner in which early case law determined whether accession had 
taken place in terms of the so-called traditional approach. Lastly, chapter two 
analyses the meaning and role of the three factors set out in Olivier.27 To achieve 
this purpose the chapter mainly relies on case law and academic literature. 
Chapter three provides an analysis of case law that is associated with what is 
known as the new approach to inaedificatio, with the aim of identifying whether there 
really has been a shift towards a new approach to inaedificatio. Accordingly, the 
chapter analyses post-1978 and post-1990 case law. The chapter also sets out the 
role of the three factors that are relied on to determine whether a movable had been 
attached to an immovable permanently in terms of the so-called new approach. To 
achieve this purpose the chapter mainly relies on case law and academic literature. 
Chapter four discusses and assesses the implications of the perceived shift 
towards the so-called new approach. As a point of departure, this chapter 
summarises conclusions from chapters two and three, particularly with regard to the 
question whether there is sufficient evidence of a shift from the traditional to the new 
approach. Based on the conclusions in this regard, the chapter proposes an 
alternative reading of the case law to describe the change that can in fact be 
discerned. Chapter four also considers the justifications that have been forwarded in 
defence of the so-called new approach as well as criticisms against the new 
approach. Finally, the chapter examines whether the court’s decision that accession 
had taken place or had not taken place (in the latter case to protect ownership of the 
movable the ownership of which had been reserved for security reasons) constitutes 
                                            
27
 Olivier v Haarhof & Company 1906 TS 497 500. 
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deprivation of property. In light of section 25(1) of the Constitution, which protects 
property owners against arbitrary deprivation of property, together with the 
methodology laid down by the Constitutional Court in FNB,28 this chapter 
investigates whether a decision that accession had taken place, or that it had not 
taken place because of commercial policy considerations, constitutes a deprivation 
of property in view of section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996. To achieve this purpose I rely mainly on case law, most importantly the 
methodology laid down by the Constitutional Court in FNB and academic literature. 
The chapter also considers whether such a deprivation, if there was one, would be 
arbitrary in terms of section 25(1) and the FNB test. Finally, the chapter raises the 
question whether a deprivation arising from accession could constitute expropriation 
of property. 
 
                                            
28
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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Chapter 2: Case law associated with the traditional 
approach 
 
2 1 Introduction 
The main purpose of the chapter is to discuss case law that is associated with the 
so-called traditional approach. As a point of departure, the chapter sets out a brief 
overview of the meaning and the historical background of the principles of 
inaedificatio. This is because inaedificatio originated in Roman law1 and was 
developed further in Roman-Dutch law.2 Therefore, a brief overview of the meaning 
and historical background will enable an understanding of how Roman law and 
Roman-Dutch law treated attachment of movables to land before inaedificatio was 
adopted in South African law. Accordingly, section two of this chapter defines 
inaedificatio and briefly provides its historical background. Section three provides an 
overview of case law that is associated with the so-called traditional approach. The 
section also sets out the manner in which early case law determined inaedificatio in 
terms of the traditional approach. Section four analyses the meaning and role of the 
three factors set out in Olivier v Haarhof & Company.3 
                                            
1
 CG van der Merwe “Original acquisition of ownership” in R Zimmermann and D Visser (eds) 
Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 701-702. See also DL Carey Miller 
The acquisition and protection of ownership (1986) 23 (this passage is not included in DL Carey Miler 
& A Pope Land title in South Africa (2
nd 
ed 2007)); D 41.1.7.10 (the English translation of the Digest 
referred to in this quote and in all further references to the Digest is from T Mommsen, P Kruger & A 
Watson The Digest of Justinian vols I, II, IV (1985)); C Lewis “Superficies solo cedit - sed quid est 
superficies?” (1979) 96 SALJ 94-107 94; FDCL de Zulueta The institutes of Gaius part II commentary 
(1953) (hereinafter referred to as Gaius) 2.73. 
2
 J Voet Commentarius ad Pandectas (1829 translated by P Gane Commentary on the Pandect 1958, 
hereafter referred to as Voet) 41.1.24; H Grotius Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche rechtsgeleertheid 
(1631 translated by RW Lee The jurisprudence of Holland vol 1 1953, hereafter referred to as Grotius) 
3.8.1. See also CG van der Merwe “Original acquisition of ownership” in R Zimmermann and D Visser 
(eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 701-702. 
3
 1906 TS 497. 
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2 2 Meaning of inaedificatio and historical background 
Inaedificatio (sometimes referred to as “building”) denotes that building materials, 
pumps, equipment or other objects and structures (being movable in nature) are 
attached permanently to land or other immovable property and thereby become part 
of that land.4 In terms of the principle omne quod inaedificatio solo cedit, shortly 
formulated as superficies solo cedit,5 buildings or movable structures that have been 
permanently attached to land cease to exist as independent things and become part 
of the immovable object to which they are attached.6 Ownership of the land and 
buildings on the land cannot be separated and, therefore, the owner of the land owns 
everything permanently attached to it.7 Practically speaking, the previous owner of 
the attached movables loses ownership because the object no longer exists as an 
independent thing and accordingly is no longer susceptible to ownership 
independent of ownership of the land. Similarly, the owner of the land becomes the 
owner of everything permanently attached to it, including the formerly independent 
movables. 
                                            
4
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 147. 
5
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 147 fn 107 translate superficies solo cedit as “buildings erected form part of the land”. 
6
 CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 1
st
 reissue vol 27 (2002) para 
337. See also DV Cowen New patterns of landownership: The transformation of the concept of 
ownership as plena in re postestas (1984) 58; CG Hall Maasdorp’s institutes of South African law vol 
2 The law of property (1976) 47-48. 
7
 RW Lee The elements of Roman law with a translation of the institutes of Justinian (4
th
 ed 1956) 
133. See also CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 1
st
 reissue vol 27 
(2002) para 337; A Borkowski & P du Plessis Textbook on Roman law (4
th
 ed 2010) 193; W 
Freedman “The test for inaedificatio: What role should the element of subjective intention play?” 
(2000) 117 SALJ 667-676 668; DL Carey Miller The acquisition and protection of ownership (1986) 
24. 
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Accession through inaedificatio is categorised as a form of original acquisition 
of ownership.8 Therefore, ownership of everything that is attached to the land is often 
said to be acquired by the landowner through attachment, without the co-operation of 
the owner of the movable.9 The owner of the movable cannot base his claim of 
ownership on the fact that he did not intend to transfer his movable property to the 
owner of the immovable because the loss of ownership does not depend on 
voluntary transfer because the structures become part of the land and the property of 
the owner of the land by operation of law. 
In Roman law two hypotheses were used to illustrate accession by building 
(inaedificatio). Gaius explained the first hypothesis as follows: if A builds a house on 
his land using B’s materials, the legal position is that A becomes the owner of the 
house, since it is built on his land regardless of the fact that the materials belonged 
to B.10 The second hypothesis provides that, where A uses his own materials to build 
a house on B’s land, notwithstanding the fact that the materials used for construction 
belong to A, B becomes the owner of the house built on his land. Therefore, the 
superficies solo cedit principle provided that everything built or attached to land 
became the property of the landowner.11 
The classical Roman jurists argued in favour of the principle of inaedificatio.12 
For instance, as is indicated above, Gaius argued that when someone has built on 
                                            
8
 Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 986 (T) 997-998. 
9
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 72. See also A Breitenbach “Reflection on inaedificatio” (1985) 48 THRHR 462-465 463-464. 
10
 Gaius 2.73. See also A Borkowski & P du Plessis Textbook on Roman law (4
th
 ed 2010) 193-194; 
AM Prichard Leage’s Roman private law founded on the institutes of Gaius and Justinian (3
rd
 ed 
1961) 182-184. 
11
 D 9.2.50. See also PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property (5
th
 ed 2006) 147; CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 1
st 
reissue vol 27 (2002) para 337; D 41.7.10; D 43.18.2; D 44.7.44.1. 
12
 See in this regard D 41.60; D 41.26; D 41.1.7.10. See also D 19.1.18; D 9.2.50; D 6.1.39; D 
18.1.78; D 6.1.59; D 44.7.44.1. 
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his own site with the materials belonging to another, he was deemed to be the owner 
of the building because he owned the land.13 Ulpian argued that if contractors have 
built on another’s land with their own stones, the stones immediately became the 
property of the owner of the ground on which they have built.14 Paul also stated that 
“thus, too if a person in transferring property stated that he is transferring the 
land without its structures, it has not the effect of preventing the structures, which 
by nature adhere to the land, from passing with it”.15 
Accordingly, one can conclude from the above texts that Roman law considered the 
owner of the land or immovable property as the owner of everything that has been 
permanently attached to it. 
The rule superficies solo cedit also applied to things inside immovable 
structures.16 According to Labeo,17 things inside immovable structures in general 
were part and parcel of the structure within which they were attached. Consequently, 
they became the property of the owner of the immovable structure or house,18 
provided that they were in the building or immovable structure for permanent use.19 
This means that things stored for temporary use could not be held to be attachments 
of the building or immovable structure. Ulpian wrote in this regard that the pipes that 
were temporarily placed in a building were not part of the building as they could only 
form part of the building if they were placed there permanently.20 Breitenbach argues 
                                            
13
 D 41.1.7.10. 
14
 D 6.1.39; D 9.2.50. 
15
 D 44.7.44.1. 
16
 D 19.1.17.7. 
17
 D 19.1.17.7. 
18
 Gaius 2.73. See also AM Prichard Leage’s Roman private law founded on the institutes of Gaius 
and Justinian (3
rd
 ed 1961) 182-184. 
19
 D 19.1.17.7. 
20
 D 19.1.17.7. 
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that Ulpian’s example of water pipes illustrates that the purpose of the thing and its 
permanent function were treated as requirements for inaedificatio in Roman law.21 
Another requirement in Roman law was that fixtures that were covered by earth 
formed part of the building even though they were not attached to the building.22 
Conversely, fixtures that were resting on the surface of the earth could not be 
regarded as forming part of the land if they were not attached to the building and not 
covered by earth.23 Scaevola illustrated the position in the form of an example: if 
Titius erected on Seius’ land a new mobile barn that is made of wooden planks, the 
question is: who is the owner of the barn – Titius or Seius? According to Scaevola 
the fact that the barn did not meet the requirement of being part of the soil by resting 
on the surface of the soil meant that it did not become the property of Seius.24 This 
indicates that for fixtures to form part of the permanent structure or land, they either 
had to be covered by or buried in the earth. This requirement may be a useful 
determinant for permanent attachment, particularly when it is disputed that a fixture 
is attached to the building. 
Labeo and Sabinus contended that, where a neighbour has built on another’s 
wall, the product belonged to the builder.25 However, Proculus’ contention was that 
the product belonged to the owner of the wall alone because of the principle that 
what is built on someone’s soil became his property. Proculus’ view was supported 
                                            
21
 A Breitenbach “Reflection on inaedificatio” (1985) 48 THRHR 462-465 463. 
22
 D 19.1.17.8. Ulpian wrote that “it is settled that lead cisterns, wells, coverings of wells, and water 
cocks that are [either] soldered to pipes or covered by earth although not attached, are part of the 
buildings”. 
23
 D 19.1.18. Javolenus wrote that “granaries, which are normally made of planking, are part of the 
building if their posts are buried in the earth; but if they rest on the surface, they fall in the category of 
“things dug and things cut”. 
24
 D 41.1.60. 
25
 D 41.1.28. 
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by Pomponius.26 Nonetheless, the rule seems to have remained that the permanent 
attachment of buildings and other movable structures to land was subject to the rule 
superficies solo cedit.27 From the above discussion one can conclude that Roman 
jurists differed in their views regarding the principle of superficies solo cedit. Some 
Roman jurists were of the view that things that have been built on someone’s land 
did not always belong to the owner of the land whereas other jurists were of the view 
that things built on someone’s land always belonged to the owner of the land. 
There were remedies available for an owner whose materials were used to 
build on another’s land or building.28 The owner of the movable materials did not 
cease to be the owner of the materials.29 However, The Law of the Twelve Tables 
provided that, although an owner of materials did not cease to have ownership of the 
materials, he could nonetheless not demand separation of the materials30 from the 
building while it was still standing.31 In this regard, Paul argued that where A’s 
timbers have been joined to B’s house, A could not vindicate them on account of The 
Law of the Twelve Tables.32 It appears that The Law of the Twelve Tables forbade 
                                            
26
 D 41.1.28. 
27
 In this regard, see D 41.1.60; D 41.1.26; D 41.1.7.10; D 19.1.17-18; D 9.2.50; D 6.1.39; D 18.1.78; 
D 6.1.59. 
28
 D 41.1.7.10; D 41.1.7.12; D 6.1.23.6. See also A Borkowski & P du Plessis Textbook on Roman law 
(4
th
 ed 2010) 193-194. However, remedies were dependant on the circumstances of each case. For 
instance, where B has built on his land with A’s materials, the legal position depended on whether 
there had been theft of A’s materials. Therefore, if B had stolen the materials from A, he was liable for 
theft under The Law of the Twelve Tables for double their value. Moreover, where B has built with his 
own materials on A’s land, the position depended on whether B had acted in good or bad faith. 
Accordingly, if he had not built in good faith (he built knowing that the land belonged to A) the legal 
position is that B would be deemed to have made a gift of his materials to A. 
29
 D 41.1.7.10. 
30
 D 41.1.7.10; D 47.3.1.1. See also JAC Thomas Textbook of Roman law (1976) 173. The Law of the 
Twelve Tables used the term tignum to refer to the materials, which literally means a beam or rafter. It 
is argued that the juristic interpretation of tignum covers all building materials. In fact, the Digest uses 
the term “beam” that covers any building materials. Therefore, all the materials used in building were 
subject to a claim by their owner in terms of The Law of the Twelve Tables. 
31
 D 41.1.7.10; D 6.1.23.6. 
32
 D 6.1.23.6. 
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the demolition of houses.33 Therefore, the right of ownership of the materials was 
dormant and could only be exercised after the building had been pulled down or 
separated by natural forces.34 Lee argues that if the right of ownership was dormant 
and could only be exercised after the building had been pulled down, this was a 
“barren consolation”,35 because an owner had to wait until the building had collapsed 
so that he could reclaim the materials that belonged to him. 
Nevertheless, Roman jurists differed in their views regarding the provision in 
The Law of the Twelve Tables that an owner could not demand separation of the 
materials from the building while it was still standing.36 On the one hand, Ulpian 
argued that the owner of the materials who built on someone’s site, which he 
possessed in good faith, should be allowed to take down the building that he had 
built, as long as it was done without any loss to the owner of the site.37 On the other 
hand, Celsus argued that in a case where the owner of the land was not willing to 
pay for the expenses that the owner of the materials had incurred, the latter should 
be allowed to take away his materials from the building, “so long as the land is not 
put in worse condition than it would be in, if there had been no building”.38 
Subsequently, Justinian followed the law that appears from the text of Ulpian and 
Celsus. Under Justinian law, a builder who had built on someone’s land in either 
                                            
33
 D 41.1.7.10. See also JAC Thomas Textbook of Roman law (1976) 173. 
34
 M Kaser Römisches Privatrecht (6
th
 ed 1960 translated by R Dannenbring Roman private law 1968) 
136. See also A Borkowski & P du Plessis Textbook on Roman law (4
th
 ed 2010) 193-194. However, 
under the law of Justinian an owner could remove his materials from the land or building as long he 
did not cause any damage to the structure. Justinian seems to have followed the position of some of 
the classical Roman law jurists. 
35
 RW Lee The elements of Roman law with the translation of the institutes of Justinian (4
th
 ed 1956) 
133. 
36
 D 41.1.7.10. 
37
 D 6.1.37; D 47.3.1.2. 
38
 D 6.1.38. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
16 
good or bad faith was allowed to reclaim his materials in terms of the ius tollendi.39 
However, this does not seem to have been the position in classical Roman law. In 
classical Roman law the ius tollendi seems to have been available only to builders 
who were bona fide possessors of land.40 Nevertheless, this application of the ius 
tollendi seems to have been in conflict with The Law of the Twelve Tables, which 
prohibited the demolition of buildings. The Law of the Twelve Tables only allowed the 
owner of the materials to reclaim them when a building has collapsed.41 
Despite the remedies available to the owner of the materials, it appears from 
the discussion above that there were few indications in Roman law regarding what 
constitutes accession through building (inaedificatio). However, Lewis states that 
Roman jurists were not concerned with what constitutes accession through 
inaedificatio, but with the compensation payable and the remedies available to the 
person who lost ownership through inaedificatio.42 In my view it seems that the focus 
was on the physical attachment to establish whether movables had formed a 
permanent part of the immovable structure by inaedificatio.43 
The principle of inaedificatio was further developed in the Roman-Dutch law of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.44 Roman-Dutch law also applied the 
                                            
39
 AM Prichard Leage’s Roman private law founded on the institutes of Gaius and Justinian (3
rd
 ed 
1961) 182-183. See also A Borkowski & P du Plessis Textbook on Roman law (4
th
 ed 2010) 193-194. 
40
 D 6.1.38; D 6.1.37; D 47.3. See also A Borkowski & P du Plessis Textbook on Roman law (4
th
 ed 
2010) 193-194. However, it is argued that uncertainties surround the ius tollendi. 
41
 D 41.1.7.10; D 6.1.23.6. 
42
 C Lewis “Superficies solo cedit - sed quid est superficies?” (1979) 96 SALJ 94-107 94. 
43
 See for example D 19.1.18, where Javolenus writes that “granaries, which are normally made of 
planking, are part of the building if their posts are buried in the earth; but if they rest on the surface, 
they fall in the category of ‘things dug and things cut’”. 
44
 Grotius 3.8.1; Voet 41.1.24. See also CG van der Merwe “Original acquisition of ownership” in R 
Zimmermann & D Visser (eds) Southern cross: Civil law and common law in South Africa (1996) 701-
702. 
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superficies solo cedit principle and accepted that everything that has acceded to land 
formed a permanent part of such land.45 Grotius stated the law as follows: 
“If any one builds upon his land with another man’s timber or stone, he is held to 
be owner of the building, so long as it stands … [I]f any one builds upon 
another’s ground with his own timber or stone, he loses the ownership, which 
lapses to the owner of the land.”46 
According to Grotius, fixtures are understood to be sold with the house.47 Roman-
Dutch law regarded movables as part of immovable property if they were affixed or 
attached thereto permanently.48 Movables were deemed to be permanently attached 
if they were fastened by nails to an immovable structure or land.49 Accordingly, 
movables such as keys, doors and windows, regardless of whether they were 
physically or constructively attached to an immovable, were all deemed to be part 
and parcel of an immovable property to which they were attached.50 The same 
applied to the sails of a windmill and the chains of a well.51 However, movables such 
as windmills were considered to be immovable only if they were fixed to the 
                                            
45
 Grotius 2.1.10. See also DV Cowen New patterns of landownership: The transformation of the 
concept of ownership as plena in re postestas (1984) 58; RW Lee An introduction to Roman-Dutch 
law (5
th
 ed 1953) 132-135; U Huber Heedensdaegse rechtsgeleertheyt (1868 translated by P Gane 
The jurisprudence of my time 1939, herein referred to as Huber) 2.6.9; S van Leeuwen Het Roomsch 
Hollandsch recht (1783 edited and translated by CW Decker & JG Kotzé Commentaries on Roman-
Dutch law 2
nd
 ed 1921, herein referred to as Van Leeuwen) 2.1.6; W Burge Commentaries on the civil 
law and the law of Holland (1887) 47-49. 
46
 Grotius 2.10.8. 
47
 Grotius 3.14.22. See also DL Carey Miller The acquisition and protection of ownership (1986) 23. 
48
 Grotius 2.10.6-2.10.10; Voet 41.1.24. See also PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg 
and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 147; CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & 
JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 1
st 
reissue vol 27 (2002) para 337. 
49
 Grotius 2.1.13; Huber 2.1.7; Van Leeuwen 2.1.6. See also DL Carey Miller The acquisition and 
protection of ownership (1986) 26. 
50
 W Burge Commentaries on the civil law and the law of Holland (1887) 49. 
51
 W Burge Commentaries on the civil law and the law of Holland (1887) 49. 
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ground.52 Pope is of the view that, considering the function of the windmill, it is not 
clear whether a windmill loses its separate legal identity by being affixed to the land, 
since a windmill’s function indicates that it is an auxiliary.53 This is true regardless of 
its attachment to the soil. 
Furthermore, movables became immovable when they were attached to or 
united with immovable property for permanent use and enjoyment.54 Examples of 
such things include timbers, pillars and marble.55 The degree of solidity or firmness 
of attachment will not be material.56 
According to Burge, certain movables became immovable by destination. For 
instance, movables such as seats in a church are said to be immovable in nature.57 
Burge further states that movables should be regarded as immovables if they are 
affixed or attached to an immovable with the intention to remain there permanently.58 
An example of a movable that became immovable if permanently attached is a 
windmill that is fixed to the soil by means of posts with the intention to remain there 
permanently.59 However, it is argued that the intention cannot be presumed when the 
                                            
52
 Macdonald Ltd v Radin NO and The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 460: 
“so also are windmills for although for the most part they do not adhere to the soil yet they must be 
considered to be immovables because they are not easily removed”. 
53
 A Pope “Inaedificatio revisited: Looking backwards in search of clarity” (2011) 128 SALJ 123-146 
137-139. 
54
 W Burge Commentaries on the civil law and the law of Holland (1887) 48. 
55
 W Burge Commentaries on the civil law and the law of Holland (1887) 48-49. According to Burge, 
timbers, pillars or marble will remain immovable notwithstanding their removal only if the intention is to 
restore them. For instance, the materials that were used to build a house remain immovable even 
after their removal from the land. 
56
 W Burge Commentaries on the civil law and the law of Holland (1887) 48. 
57
 W Burge Commentaries on the civil law and the law of Holland (1887) 50. 
58
 W Burge Commentaries on the civil law and the law of Holland (1887) 49. 
59
 See also Macdonald Ltd v Radin NO and The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 
454 459. However, the principle that a movable becomes attached if the annexor has affixed it with 
the intention that it becomes permanent has proved to be relevant but problematic in recent South 
African case law. The problems regarding intention are discussed in 2 4 below. 
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person who affixes the materials has only a temporary interest in the land or house.60 
For instance, a movable remained movable if it had been affixed by a tenant who 
had a temporary interest in the land,61 provided that it could be removed without any 
damage to the land.62 These were exceptions to the principle that an owner acquires 
ownership of the property built on his land.63 However, if the materials that were 
used to build belonged to someone other than the tenant, the owner of the land was 
bound to pay compensation if the materials remained part of the house or land.64 
Therefore, Roman and Roman-Dutch law treated accession of movables to 
immovables as acquisition of ownership by the owner of the land, but subject to 
compensation.65 The compensation that the owner of the materials was entitled to in 
Roman-Dutch law was different from that in Roman law. In Roman law, the owner of 
the materials that were used to build on another’s land could institute the actio de 
tigno iniuncto for double damages.66 However, in Roman-Dutch law the actio de 
tigno iniuncto fell into disuse and it was substituted by a general action for 
damages.67 Accordingly, one can conclude that neither the Roman nor Roman-Dutch 
law had a simple, clear criterion that was used to determine whether the movables 
had become permanently attached to land. It seems that the focus was on the 
                                            
60
 W Burge Commentaries on the civil law and the law of Holland (1887) 49. 
61
 W Burge Commentaries on the civil law and the law of Holland (1887) 49. 
62
 DL Carey Miller The acquisition and protection of ownership (1986) 35; CG van der Merwe “Things” 
in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 1
st
 reissue vol 27 (2002) paras 336-337; Voet 6.1.36. 
63
 De Beers Consolidated Mines v London and South African Exploration Company (1892-1893) 10 
SC 359. See also DL Carey Miller The acquisition and protection of ownership (1986) 35. 
64
 DL Carey Miller The acquisition and protection of ownership (1986) 33. See also PJ Badenhorst, 
JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 154. 
65
 Huber 2.6.10-11; Grotius 2.10.8. See also C Lewis “Superficies solo cedit - sed quid est 
superficies?” (1979) 96 SALJ 94-107 94. 
66
 D 6.1.23.6. See also PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law 
of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 154. 
67
 RW Lee An introduction to Roman-Dutch law (5
th
 ed 1953) 135-136. See also PJ Badenhorst, JM 
Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 154. 
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remedies that were available to the owner of the movables after attachment, while 
the owner of the land became the owner of everything that was attached to the land. 
The principle of inaedificatio was further applied and developed in the South 
African case law. However, it seems that South African courts have found it difficult 
to determine whether movables had become part of land through inaedificatio. This 
is probably because there were no clear guiding rules to determine attachment of 
movables to immovables in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. This led to the court in 
Olivier v Haarhof & Company68 (“Olivier”) to develop three factors that it considered 
to determine whether a wood and iron building had become permanently attached to 
land.69 The criteria set out in Olivier70 were followed in subsequent cases.71 Although 
these criteria seemed to be a solution to the disputes surrounding inaedificatio, 
subsequent cases still faced the problem regarding the interpretation and application 
of these criteria, more particularly the extent to which the intention of the annexor 
could play a role when determining whether accession had taken place.72 
The weight that subsequent case law attached to the third factor varied from 
case to case. Consequently, academic commentators argue that this led to the 
development of different approaches to determine accession, namely the traditional 
                                            
68
 1906 TS 497. 
69
 See 2 3 below. 
70
 Olivier v Haarhof & Company 1906 TS 497. 
71
 See for instance Victoria Falls Power Co Ltd v Colonial Treasurer 1909 TS 140 145-146; Deputy-
Sheriff of Pretoria v Heymann 1909 TS 280 284; Macdonald Ltd v Radin NO and The Potchefstroom 
Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454; Newcastle Collieries Co Ltd v Borough of Newcastle 1916 
AD 561; Van Wezel v Van Wezel’s Trustee 1924 AD 409; R v Mabula 1927 AD 159; Caltex (Africa) 
Ltd v Director of Valuations 1961 (1) SA 525 (C) 528; Edwards v Barberton Mines Ltd 1961 (1) SA 
187 (T); Standard-Vacuum Refining Co v Durban City Council 1961 (2) SA 669 (A). See also DL 
Carey Miller The acquisition and protection of ownership (1986) 23; C Lewis “Superficies solo cedit - 
sed quid est superficies?” (1979) 96 SALJ 94-107 95. 
72
 See for instance Macdonald Ltd v Radin NO and The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 
1915 AD 454. 
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approach, the new approach and the omnibus approach.73 In the next section, I 
discuss notable early case law that is alleged to have been associated with the 
traditional approach and how the early decisions applied the test for inaedificatio as 
identified in Olivier. 
 
2 3 Case law associated with the traditional approach 
Case law74 that is associated with the traditional approach is said to have applied the 
three factors that the court in Olivier75 has identified to determine inaedificatio in a 
specific manner. The general assumption is that the early decisions associated with 
the traditional approach emphasised the two objective factors and only resorted to 
the subjective intention factor if the first two did not produce a clear outcome. 
In Olivier the appellants appealed against the decision of the magistrate that 
authorised a messenger of the court to attach certain movables. In the process, the 
messenger attached amongst other things a wood-and-iron building that belonged to 
one Roux. The building was erected upon land purchased from the appellants by 
Roux. The purchase price of the land was payable in instalments. Roux fell in arrears 
and the messenger attached the house. The appellants claimed that the building, 
                                            
73
 CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 1
st
 reissue vol 27 (2002) para 
337. See also I Knobel “Accession of movables to movables and inaedificatio – South Africa and 
some common law countries” (2011) 74 THRHR 296-304 299; I Knobel “Intention as a determining 
factor in instances of accession of movables to land – Subjective or objective?” (2008) 41 De Jure 
156-164 156-157; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of 
property (5
th
 ed 2006) 148-149; B Maripe “Intention and the original acquisition of ownership: Whither 
inaedificatio?” (1998) 115 SALJ 544-552 546-548. 
74
 Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A) 281; Unimark 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 986 (T) 998. See also PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
153; CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 1
st
 reissue vol 27 (2002) 
paras 337-338. 
75
 Olivier v Haarhof & Company 1906 TS 497. 
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made of wood and iron, was a fixture and therefore an improvement belonging to 
them.76 
The question was whether the wood-and-iron building became immovable or a 
fixture to the land as described. Should the court find that the building is immovable, 
the messenger could not attach it.77 The court held that the authorities on accession 
to immovable property did not lay down a general principle to decide what is 
movable or immovable.78 Therefore, it was impossible to lay down one general rule 
to determine whether accession of movable to immovable property had taken place. 
According to the court each case must depend on its own facts.79 The court stated 
that in order to establish whether the building was immovable, the points to be 
considered are the nature of the structure; the manner in which it is fixed to the soil; 
and the intention of the person who erected it. Significantly, the court described the 
intention of the person who erected the building as “in some respect” the most 
important element of attachment.80 After applying the above criteria to the facts, the 
court held that the building was immovable. 
The criteria that the court in Olivier identified to determine whether a building 
made of wood and iron was a fixture were approved and applied by the Appellate 
Division in Macdonald Ltd v Radin NO and The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries 
Co Ltd81 (“Macdonald”) to determine whether a certain machine was attached to 
                                            
76
 Olivier v Haarhof & Company 1906 TS 497 499: The court described the building as “of 
considerable size. It was 33 by 32 ft. Nor was it a mere outbuilding; it had five rooms, and so far as 
the evidence goes was used as a dwelling-house by Roux. It rested on wooden posts projecting 6 or 
9 ins. out of the ground, and was fastened to them by nails which the magistrate says were[] about 6 
ins. long. The iron which formed the sides of the house came down on every side to the ground. On 
one side the sheets had been sunk below the surface”. 
77
 Olivier v Haarhof & Company 1906 TS 497 499. 
78
 Olivier v Haarhof & Company 1906 TS 497 497. 
79
 Olivier v Haarhof & Company 1906 TS 497 500. 
80
 Olivier v Haarhof & Company 1906 TS 497 500. 
81
 1915 AD 454. 
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land. According to recent case law82 and academic literature83 the traditional 
approach was set out in Macdonald.84 In terms of the traditional approach, the 
enquiry for determining accession begins by assessing first the nature and object of 
the movable and the manner and degree of attachment (objective factors).85 
Accordingly, if the objective factors conclude that accession has occurred, the third 
factor, namely the intention of the owner of the movable, is not considered.86 
Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert87 argue that this approach is illustrated by the 
following dictum in Macdonald: 
“The importance of the first two factors is self-evident from the very nature of the 
inquiry. But the importance of intention is for practical purposes greater still; for in 
many instances it is the determining element. Yet it is sometimes settled by the 
mere nature of the annexation. The article may be actually incorporated in the 
realty, or the attachment may be so secure that separation would involve 
substantial injury either to the immovable or its accessory. In such cases the 
intention as to permanency would be beyond dispute”.88 
It appears that the intention of the owner of the movable is considered only if the 
objective factors are inconclusive to determine whether accession has occurred.89 
                                            
82
 Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 986 (T) 998. See also 
Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A) 281. 
83
 H Mostert, A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the 
law of property in South Africa (2010) 169. See also A Pope “Inaedificatio revisited: Looking 
backwards in search of clarity” (2011) 128 SALJ 123-146 128; PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H 
Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 149. 
84
 Macdonald Ltd v Radin NO and The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454. 
85
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 149. 
86
 CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 1
st
 reissue vol 27 (2002) paras 
337-338. 
87
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 148. 
88
 Macdonald Ltd v Radin NO and The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 467. 
89
 Macdonald Ltd v Radin NO and The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 467; 
Pettersen v Sorvaag 1955 (3) SA 624 (A) 627. See also H Mostert, A Pope (eds), P Badenhorst, W 
Freedman, J Pienaar & J van Wyk The principles of the law of property in South Africa (2010) 169; PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
24 
The view that the intention of the owner of the movable is considered only if the 
assessment of the objective factors is inconclusive is explained by the court in 
Macdonald as follows: 
“But controversy generally arises where the separate identity of the article 
annexed is preserved, and when detachment can be affected with more or less 
ease. Indeed, it may happen (as has happened here) that the annexation is in 
itself consistent with the article either being, or not being, a portion of the realty; 
and it thus becomes necessary to examine with the greatest care the intention 
with which it was annexed”.90 
In R v Mabula91 the court per Innes CJ stated that 
“[t]he nature of the structure, the manner of its annexation to the realty, and the 
intention of the person who annexed it; these are factors chiefly to be 
considered. But it by no means follows that they all require consideration equally 
or at all in every case. In many instances the nature of the thing or the mode of 
attachment may conclude the enquiry. But where the application of these is 
indecisive the element of intention may settle the matter”. 
Accordingly, case law that is associated with the traditional approach is said to 
consider first the objective factors in determining inaedificatio and only if the 
assessment of the objective factors is inconclusive of whether accession has 
occurred, the intention of the owner of the movable should be considered.92 The 
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question is: how does one determine, in terms of the traditional approach, whether 
the owner of the movable intended to attach the movable to land permanently? 
If a movable is built and incorporated into the building to the extent that it 
cannot be separated without damage to the building or the movable itself, this is an 
indication that attachment of the movable to such a building was intended to be 
permanent.93 In Newcastle Collieries Co Ltd v Borough of Newcastle94 Innes CJ 
stated that “the intention of permanency is presumed from the method of annexation; 
and though the builder may have reserved the right in a specified eventuality to 
remove the structure, still while it stands it remains portion of the realty”.95 
Lewis96 argues that the method for ascertaining what the intention of the owner 
of the movable was during attachment is “crisply enunciated” in Standard-Vacuum 
Refining Co v Durban City Council (“Standard-Vacuum”).97 In this case the court had 
to decide whether certain tanks were immovable for the purpose of determining the 
value of the land on which they stood. According to Van Winsen AJA, “the object of 
the enquiry is to ascertain whether the movable has been attached to the land or 
other immovable with the intention that it should remain permanently attached 
thereto”.98 The judge stated that intention is the most important factor. However, to 
determine whether the intention was to attach a movable to land permanently, regard 
had to be given to the nature of the movable, the method and degree of attachment 
to the land, and whether the movable could be readily removed without injury to itself 
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or to the land to which it was attached.99 In other words, although intention is the 
most important factor, it is inferred from the objective factors. 
According to Van Winsen AJA, if a movable is capable of acceding to the land 
and become secure to an extent that if it is separated from the land it will cause 
substantial injury either to the land or the movable, “it must be inferred that the 
movable was attached with the intention of permanency and for that reason it must 
be held to have become … immovable”.100 Furthermore, the court stated that, if after 
examining the physical features, the results indicate that attachment is inconclusive 
(in the sense that an examination of the physical features leads to no conclusive 
inference), the annexor’s intention (presumably the stated intention) is decisive.101 
The court applied the above test and examined the physical features of the 
tanks. It held that the tanks were never at any stage independent from the land. 
Further, the tanks were of such great size and weight upon the land on which they 
stood that they were not movable from their location by ordinary means unless they 
were cut up, which – according to the court – would have resulted in loss of their 
identity.102 Accordingly, the court stated that the physical features raised an 
inference that the attachment of the tanks was intended to be permanent.103 
The effect of the Standard-Vacuum decision is that the objective factors are 
“not regarded as totally independent from the intention with which the attachment 
took place”.104 The objective factors are examined with the object of arriving at the 
objective intention (inferred intention). In other words, if a movable is attached to 
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land to the extent that separation would cause damage to the land or the movable 
itself, this would give rise to an inference that the movable was attached to the land 
with the intention that it becomes permanent. Therefore, it seems that in terms of the 
traditional approach, intention is important but it must be inferred from the objective 
factors to determine whether a movable is attached to land permanently. If the 
inferred intention does not conclusively indicate that accession has occurred, it 
seems that the stated intention of the owner or annexor of the movable (presumably 
as stated in the contract) should come into play.105 
However, there is early case law that first considered the stated intention of the 
owner of the movable in determining accession. Surprisingly, one of the cases that 
considered the stated intention of the owner of the movable as the most important is 
Macdonald, which is said to have set out the traditional approach. Arguably, what 
transpired in Macdonald contradicts the impression that only recent case law is 
associated with the so-called new approach, which considers the intention of the 
owner of the movable as the most important factor. However, although it is true that 
the court in Macdonald considered the intention of the owner of the movable as the 
most important factor, it is significant that the objective factors in that case were not 
decisive proof that accession had occurred. The machinery was not permanently 
attached to the building because it could be removed with ease. Too much 
significance should therefore not be attached to the court having resort to the 
intention factor in this particular case. 
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2 4 Analysis of the three factors identified in Olivier 
2 4 1 Introduction 
The then Appellate Division held in R v Mabula106 that the three factors identified in 
Olivier v Haarhof & Company107 do not require equal consideration. Hence, the first 
two factors, namely the nature and object of the movable and the manner and 
degree of attachment of a movable to an immovable, may in many instances be 
conclusive of whether accession had occurred.108 However, it was stated above that 
there are several early cases (usually associated with what is known as the 
traditional approach) that considered the subjective intention of the owner of the 
movable as the most important of the three factors.109 
This section provides an analysis of the three factors, namely the nature and 
object of the movable; the degree and manner of attachment of the movable; and the 
intention of the annexor or owner. The purpose of the analysis is to examine the 
meaning and role of each factor through the early case law. In the course of the 
analysis, I point out some instances in which the subjective intention of the owner of 
the movable is considered as the most important factor from the start of the inquiry. I 
also indicate the probable reasons for this approach. Moreover, the section briefly 
outlines the instances in which the objective factors may conclude the inquiry for 
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determining accession despite the emphasis being placed on the intention of the 
owner of the movable. 
 
2 4 2 The nature and object of the movable 
This factor entails that a movable must, in its nature, be capable of acceding to realty 
(land).110 Movables such as windows and door frames may be capable of being 
attached to the building and as such will be regarded as part of a building if 
incorporated in such a building.111 According to Carey Miller, the nature and object of 
the movable “is largely a matter of recognising the obvious destination of certain 
things”.112 He argues that things like chimney-pots, guttering, plumbing, electrical 
fittings, which are permanently attached to buildings, would almost always lose their 
independent legal identity by becoming part and parcel of the building in which they 
are incorporated. 
In many cases, having regard to the nature and object of the things that are 
incorporated into the building, it could be “self-evident from the very nature of the 
inquiry” that they are intended to be permanent in such a building.113 For instance, 
the nature and object of the bricks and cement that have been used in the 
construction of a house indicate its capability of acceding to land or being 
incorporated into an immovable after being used.114 Consequently, the 
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manufacturers and suppliers of cement cannot retain ownership of cement after it 
had been used to build a house, since it is not easy to prove that cement that has 
been used for construction did not form a permanent part of the building – the very 
nature and purpose of the object indicate the contrary.115 
Furthermore, the nature and the object of the structure may not only prove 
capable of accession but can also indicate that the objects are destined to serve the 
soil or another immovable structure.116 For instance, in Van Wezel v Van Wezel’s 
Trustee117 (“Van Wezel”) the court had to determine whether a windmill erected by a 
lessee formed part of the immovable. The windmill was used for dairy purposes and 
for supplying the house with water.118 The court held that the windmill was 
immovable because its nature and object plainly indicated that it was destined to 
serve the land permanently.119 Accordingly, because of their nature and purpose, 
movables such as windmills, irrigation systems, oil tanks serving industrial premises, 
zinc and steel sheds, carports and undercover parking structures should all qualify 
as immovables after they have been constructed on or into an immovable.120 
The application and interpretation of the nature and object of the movable as a 
factor varies from case to case. A movable may in some instances be regarded as 
immovable because the nature and purpose indicate that such a movable was 
destined to serve the land permanently even though the manner of attachment 
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indicates that the movable could be removed from the land with ease. In Van Wezel 
the court held that a windmill was immovable although it could be removed from the 
land with relative ease.121 Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert argue that the judgment 
in Van Wezel “proves that the classification of things almost invariably involves an 
adjustment of conflicting interests and is not the result of the application of a rule of 
thumb”.122 Moreover, they argue that classifications of things as movables or 
immovables may depend on the kind of “object and construction of a particular 
statute”.123 
It seems that courts may decide accession in the manner that they view as fair 
and equitable to the parties. Sometimes the interest of the owner of the movable are 
protected when judging whether a movable has become permanently attached to 
land. Hence, in other cases a movable may remain movable inasmuch as it can be 
removed from the land with ease. Moreover, a movable may be regarded as 
movable regardless of the fact that its nature and purpose indicate that it was 
destined to serve the land permanently.124 Also in other cases a movable may be 
classified as immovable even though such a movable can be removed from the land 
with ease.125 
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In Macdonald the court had to decide whether certain machinery bought in 
terms of a hire-purchase had become permanently attached to land. It appeared that 
the machinery was installed for permanent use. However, the existence of a hire-
purchase agreement caused the court to regard the intention of the owner of the 
movable as the decisive factor to determine accession. According to the majority 
judgment, the seller did not intend to transfer ownership because the purchase price 
of the machinery was not paid in full. This implies that if the purchase price was paid 
in full, ownership of the machinery would have passed to the landowner.126 However, 
because of the presence of a hire-purchase agreement (in which the owner reserved 
ownership of the machinery) and coupled with the fact that the machine was 
removable with ease, the court held that the machinery remained movable despite 
the fact that its nature and purpose indicated that it was destined to serve the land 
permanently. The decision in Macdonald was seemingly aimed at protecting the 
interests of the owner of the machinery. This was supported by the fact that the 
machine was not permanently attached to the land. 
In Land and Agricultural Bank of SWA v Howaldt and Vollmer,127 the court held 
that a certain windmill remained movable despite the fact that its nature and purpose 
indicated that it was attached to the land permanently. The court held that the 
windmill could not become a permanent attachment to the land because the owner 
of the windmill intended that the windmill would become a permanent attachment 
only if the purchase price of the windmill was paid in full.128 Similarly, in Champion 
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Ltd v Van Staden Bros and Another129 a windmill, sold in terms of a hire-purchase 
agreement, was erected on a farm. The court held that the windmill remained 
movable despite the fact that its nature and purpose indicated that it was attached to 
the land permanently. According to the court the owner of the windmill sold it on a 
condition that it was not supposed to become the property of the purchaser until he 
paid the full purchase price.130 Accordingly, since the purchase price was not paid in 
full the court held that the windmill remained movable and did not become 
permanently attached to the land. 
In Johnson & Co Ltd v Grand Hotel and Theatre Co Ltd in Liquidation131 the 
court also had to decide whether certain automatic sprinklers (for extinguishing fire in 
a building) were permanently attached. The court held, after inspecting the premises 
and considering the statement of facts agreed upon by the parties in writing, that the 
manner in which the sprinklers were installed and affixed to the buildings indicated 
that “if there had been no special agreement it would have amounted to a fixture and 
formed part and parcel of the ground”.132 Therefore, it was clear that the nature and 
purpose of the sprinklers indicated that they were installed in the building 
permanently. The court held that the sprinklers remained the exclusive property of 
the plaintiffs until the payment of the full purchase price. Accordingly, the court 
ordered the defendants to pay for the sprinklers and that, if they failed to pay, the 
plaintiff had to remove the sprinklers but subject to a condition that removal is 
conducted without damage to the building.133 
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However, an indication that the nature and purpose of the movables indicate 
that they are intended to serve the immovable property permanently seems to blur 
the distinction between auxiliaries and accessory items.134 Auxiliaries are also 
movables that may belong to the immovable because of their destination, but they 
are physically not part of the immovable.135 Auxiliaries maintain their independent 
physical existence, regardless of being joined to the principal item.136 Auxiliaries are 
distinguishable from accessory items that lose their separate legal identity as a result 
of accession to the principal thing.137 Yet, it is usually argued that they follow the 
principal in certain circumstances.138 In Van Wezel139 the court followed the views of 
Paulus and Johannes Voet in classifying a windmill as an accessory to the land.140 
Accordingly, it seems that courts may sometimes confuse auxiliary items with the 
accessory items that form part of the land on which they are sufficiently attached. 
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Nonetheless, since the application of the nature and object of the movable as a 
factor for determining accession varies from case to case, a court may on the one 
hand decide that a movable has become immovable as an attachment to land 
because its nature and purpose indicate that it was attached to serve the land 
permanently. This may be the case regardless of whether a movable can be 
detached from the land with ease. On the other hand, a court may decide that a 
movable remains movable regardless of the fact that its nature and purpose indicate 
that the movable was destined to serve the land permanently. In many cases this 
approach was supported by the fact that a movable can be removed from the land 
with ease. However, the manner in which a movable is attached to land may change 
this position. For instance, if the manner in which a movable is attached to land 
indicates that a movable is firmly attached to land to the extent that it cannot be 
removed, that is an indication that a movable was permanently attached to land. This 
is discussed in the next section. 
 
2 4 3 The way in which the movable is fixed on the land 
This factor developed in Roman law141 and was further followed in Roman-Dutch142 
and South African law.143 In Roman-Dutch law all things that were fixed to land or 
immovable structures had to be attached to the earth, sometimes by means of 
nails.144 If the manner in which a structure was fixed indicated that the structure was 
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fixed to an extent that it could not be removed, it became part of the soil or building 
in which it had been affixed. Carey Miller argues that this factor indicates “an obvious 
measure of the critical issue of permanence”.145 
However, questions always arise regarding the permanency of the structure. In 
which circumstances will the manner and the degree of attachment indicate 
permanency? In Macdonald Innes CJ held that in order for a movable to be 
considered part of a permanent structure, “there must be some effective attachment 
(whether by mere weight or by physical connection)”.146 According to Van der 
Merwe, two tests are employed to establish whether the manner and degree of the 
attachment render a movable immovable. Firstly, the attached article must lose its 
own identity and become an integral part of the immovable. Secondly, the 
attachment must be so secure that separation would involve substantial injury either 
to the immovable or to the accessory.147 
According to the first test, an article must be attached to something physical 
and immovable.148 Examples include doors, windows and roof tiles, which are part of 
the house or building after they have been incorporated into it. However, mere 
functional or economic integration is not enough for an article to be rendered 
permanent, even though it is attached to immovable property.149 This means that if 
the main component is immovable, this does not always change the status of all 
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other movable articles attached to it from being movable to immovable. This is 
regardless of the fact that the movable articles form a functional unit with the main 
component, which is immovable in nature.150 For instance, cotton mills, mining 
machinery or irrigation systems, all objects that form a functional unit with the land, 
might not be considered as forming one thing with the land or other immovable 
property in a legal sense.151 The approach that mere functional or economic 
integration is not enough for a movable to be rendered immovable, even though it is 
attached to immovable property, seems to have resulted in unsatisfactory results in 
recent case law.152 
Nonetheless, the other test, namely that the extent of attachment must be so 
secure that separation would involve substantial injury either to the immovable or to 
the accessory, has been labelled a “negative test of considering the consequences 
of an attempt to remove the annexed thing”.153 If an article cannot be removed 
without causing damage to itself or the land, it may be regarded as having formed 
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part of that land by inaedificatio.154 In R v Mabula155 the court had to determine 
whether a certain structure was immovable in nature so as to warrant a charge and 
conviction of arson. The court per Innes CJ held that “[t]he house was a dwelling and 
was so constructed that it could not be removed without being broken down”.156 
It appears from R v Mabula157 that, since the house could not be removed 
without being broken down into pieces, it had lost its independent existence as a 
movable thing and through attachment had become part of the immovable thing. 
However, if there is proof that the house can be removed by being broken down into 
pieces and placed again on another piece of land, such a house can be regarded as 
movable property.158 In Pettersen v Sorvaag159 the court held as follows: 
“The fact that the house was very heavy and probably incapable of being moved 
as a unit does not detract from the fact that it was so constructed that it could be 
taken to pieces which could be removed and put together again on another site. 
The house was brought from Norway by a Norwegian and there is no evidence 
to show that Ellefsen did not regard it as a movable house.”160 
From this quote it seems that the court applied and interpreted the manner and 
degree of attachment less rigorously to protect the interest of the owner of the 
house. This is because the court considered the evidence from Norway that the 
house in dispute could be taken into pieces despite the fact that it is very heavy and 
probably incapable of being moved. 
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Nonetheless, academic commentators161 criticise reliance on the criterion that a 
movable is permanent if the extent of the attachment is so secure that separation 
would involve substantial injury either to the immovable or to the accessory itself. For 
instance, Van der Merwe162 and Carey Miller163 question whether the possibility of 
removing a movable without damage is still practicable. The reason for this is that 
modern technological advances can make it possible for an article to be removed 
without any damage to the land or building to which it is attached much easier than 
before.164 This may also mean that people will now attach movables in such a way, 
on purpose, that it can be easily removed. 
However, one can argue that although technological development may defeat 
the purpose of this factor, it however remains relevant to decide whether accession 
has occurred, particularly in cases where ownership of the movable that is attached 
to land is reserved as a security for payment of the purchase price. Therefore, in 
cases where a movable is attached to land subject to a special arrangement, the 
degree and manner of attachment may indicate the intention behind attachment. For 
instance, if a movable is attached to land to the extent that is so secure that 
separation would involve substantial injury either to the immovable or movable, this 
                                            
161
 CG van der Merwe “The law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1980 ASSAL 230-233 
232-233. See also CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 1
st 
reissue vol 
27 (2002) para 337; CG van der Merwe “The law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1990 
ASSAL 214-216 215-216; Carey Miller The acquisition and protection of ownership (1986) 26. 
162
 CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 1
st
 reissue vol 27 (2002) para 
337. 
163
 DL Carey Miller The acquisition and protection of ownership (1986) 26. 
164
 DL Carey Miller & A Pope “Acquisition of ownership” in R Zimmermann, D Visser & K Reid (eds) 
Mixed legal systems in comparative perspective: Property and obligation in Scotland and South Africa 
(2004) 679. See also CG van der Merwe “The law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1980 
ASSAL 230-233 232-233. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
40 
would be an indication of intention to attach the movable permanently even though 
ownership of the movable is reserved.165 
Practically speaking, the fact that the owner of the movable intended the 
movable to become permanently attached to the land only if the conditions of sale or 
any other arrangement were complied with, would not prevail over an indication that 
a movable is inseparably attached to land.166 In Macdonald, Wessels AJA held for 
the minority that a movable will form part of the land “even if the owner of the 
movable contracts with the owner of the land that the object is to be regarded as a 
movable, it will lose its [movable character] if firmly built to the land, and it will pass 
to the purchaser of the land notwithstanding the contract”.167 This means that a 
movable will form part of the land inasmuch as it is firmly attached to the land 
regardless of the retention of ownership in the contract of purchase. 
Therefore, if the objective factors do not indicate that a firm attachment of the 
movable to land has taken place, and if ownership of the movable is reserved in the 
contract of sale, the court may hold that accession did not take place to protect the 
interests of seller/owner of the movable.168 Nevertheless, the degree and manner of 
attachment may always remain indications of the intention behind attachment. 
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2 4 4 The intention of the person who erected the movable on the land 
This factor may be described as the subjective indication of accession. The relevant 
intention to determine accession was – in terms of the earlier cases – the intention of 
the annexor at the time of the attachment.169 However, this position changed in 
Macdonald,170 where the court was faced with the question of whose intention must 
be considered to ascertain permanency of the attachment.171 In Macdonald Innes CJ 
stated that “the intention required (in conjunction with annexation) to destroy the 
identity, to merge the title, or to transfer the dominium of movable property, must 
surely be the intention of the owner [of the movable]”.172 
According to Innes CJ in Macdonald, the decision in Olivier and all other South 
African cases considered the intention of the owner of the movable property to 
determine accession.173 The court stated that considering the intention of the owner 
is what is expected in view of the fundamental principle that a non-owner cannot 
transfer the property of another, although this is subject to a few exceptions.174 The 
view that the intention of the owner of the movable (and not of the annexor) is 
important to determine whether accession has occurred has been consistently 
followed in case law subsequent to Macdonald.175 Interestingly, some of these cases 
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concerned movables sold on hire-purchase agreement, as was the case in 
Macdonald.176 
In Land and Agricultural Bank of SWA v Howaldt and Vollmer177 the court 
considered the intention of the owner of the windmill to determine whether a windmill 
sold in terms of hire-purchase agreement had become attached to the land. The 
court held that the windmill could not pass to one Stoermer because the owners of 
the windmill had reserved a right to remove it in the event of a failure to pay the 
purchase price in full.178 Similarly, in Champion Ltd v Van Staden Bros and 
Another179 Watermeyer J held that the court was bound to follow the decision of 
Macdonald. According to Watermeyer J, to determine whether a windmill has 
become part of the farm depends on “the intention with which it was attached to the 
soil and the intention which must be looked at is not the intention of the person who 
attached it, but the intention of the owner of the movable”.180 
In recent case law that involves instalment sale agreements (with reservation-
of-ownership clauses), the courts have also considered the intention of the owner of 
the movable to determine accession.181 For instance, in Konstanz Properties (Pty) 
Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk182 the court considered the decision in 
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Macdonald and held that the intention of the owner of the movable, and not of the 
annexor, had to be considered to establish whether accession had occurred.183 
The intention of the owner of the movable is said to be relevant in two different 
forms, namely the inferred intention184 and the stated or actual subjective 
intention.185 The inferred intention is the intention of the owner of the movable as 
determined with reference to the objective indications of accession. For instance, in 
Standard-Vacuum Refining Co v Durban City Council186 Van Winsen AJA stated that 
regard had to be given to the nature of the movable, the method and degree of 
attachment to the land, and whether a movable could be readily removed without 
injury to itself or to the land for a court to determine the intention of the owner of the 
movable to attach a movable to land permanently.187 
The stated or actual subjective intention of the owner of the movable is – in 
most cases – indicated in the contract of sale of the movable. According to Van 
Winsen AJA, it seems that the stated or actual subjective intention of the owner of 
the movable should be considered if the intention as inferred from the objective 
factors is inconclusive.188 Carey Miller criticises reliance upon both the inferred 
intention and the professed or actual intention. He argues that the inferred intention 
is “largely superfluous – being no more than the court’s objective assessment of the 
circumstances as indication of permanence”.189 He further contends that the actual 
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or professed intention is irrelevant in determining inaedificatio, since it is a form of 
original acquisition of ownership based on the physical attachment of the accessory 
to the principal thing.190 
However, the question is: what would happen if the intention of the owner of the 
movable conflicts with the objective indications of accession in cases where intention 
is considered as the most important factor? This is because the inferred intention or 
objective indications of accession may be in conflict with the stated intention of the 
owner (probably as stated in the contract).191 It seems that if there is a conflict 
between the intention that is inferred from the physical features and the stated 
intention of the owner, the inferred intention or objective factors must be decisive if 
they confirm that accession has occurred.192 This implies that the stated intention of 
the owner will not be considered in the event when it conflicts with the result of the 
inferred intention or objective factors that confirm that accession has occurred.193 
According to Goldberg “the physical features are always only [indiciae] of the 
annexor’s true intention, which remains to the end the paramount consideration” in 
determining inaedificatio.194 
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The intention of the owner of the movable (as stated in the contract) was 
considered as the most important factor in some early case law.195 Although the 
intention of the owner was sometimes regarded as the most important factor, the 
objective factors in the specific facts of those cases were not decisive of whether 
inaedificatio had occurred and there was therefore no direct conflict between the 
stated intention of the owner and the inferred intention derived from the physical 
features. In Johnson & Co Ltd v Grand Hotel and Theatre Co Ltd in Liquidation196 the 
court held that certain sprinklers had to be removed in the event of failure to pay the 
full purchase price by the defendants. The court’s decision to remove the sprinklers 
was substantiated by the fact that it was not physically impossible to detach the 
sprinklers from the buildings. Moreover, the court stated that it was not legally 
impossible to remove the sprinklers because removal was not “contrary to law or 
morality, or to public policy or interest”.197 Similarly, in Macdonald Innes CJ held that 
the intention of the owner of the machine was important to determine whether it 
became part of the building since the machine was “not physically incorporated in 
the realty”.198 If the objective factors are inconclusive too much significance should 
not be attached to the decision to focus on the intention. 
According to Goldberg, although the intention of the owner of the movable was 
sometimes considered as the most important in various cases, dicta always “found 
their way into the judgments which were to lend themselves to the interpretation that 
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intention might not always be of primary importance”.199 Therefore, even though the 
intention of the owner of the movable was sometimes considered as more important 
in various cases, it in any event did not conflict with the objective factors. 
 
2 5 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss case law that is associated with what is known 
as the traditional approach when determining inaedificatio. As a point of departure, 
the chapter outlines a brief historical background of the general principles of the law 
regarding inaedificatio. Inaedificatio has its origin in Roman law and it was received 
into Roman-Dutch and South African law. Subsequently, South African courts were 
faced with the question: what constitutes permanent attachment by inaedificatio? It 
appears that this question was never central in Roman law, where the focus was 
instead on the remedies available and not on the question of when accession had 
taken place. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that physical features were only 
indications of accession of movables to land. The same can be said for Roman-
Dutch law. 
The chapter points out that the traditional approach is mainly derived from dicta 
in the Macdonald case, and that case law that is associated with the traditional 
approach applied the three factors that the court identified in Olivier.200 In 
determining accession, early case law indicates that the first two factors may be 
evident from the beginning of the inquiry whether accession has occurred, and that 
the first two factors are examined with the object of arriving at the objective (inferred) 
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intention. However, if the results of examining the objective factors and inferred 
intention are inconclusive to determine whether accession has occurred, the stated 
or actual intention of the owner of the movable should be considered to determine 
accession. 
The chapter also points out that some of the early cases (including Macdonald) 
already considered the stated or actual intention of the owner of the movable as 
important to determine accession. The stated intention of the owner of the movable 
was considered as important seemingly to protect the interest of the owner of the 
movable. However, in all of those cases the objective factors were not conclusive of 
attachment and therefore these cases did not present an opportunity to determine 
what would happen if the stated intention of the owner of the movable came up 
against (or was in conflict with) the inferred intention in the determination of 
accession. It seems that various cases determined accession in a manner that they 
thought was fair and equitable to the parties. This is because a movable can 
sometimes be regarded as immovable regardless of the fact that it could be removed 
with ease. 
Recent case law201 and academic literature202 indicate that post-1978 case law 
is associated with the so-called new approach when determining inaedificatio. The 
view is that the so-called new approach considers the intention of the owner of the 
movable as the most important factor in determining accession. However, this 
chapter has revealed that there were cases decided before 1978 that already placed 
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an emphasis on the intention of the owner of the movable. In the next chapter, I 
discuss case law that is said to be associated with what is known as the new 
approach in order to determine whether the new approach is really new. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
49 
Chapter 3: Case law associated with the new approach 
 
3 1 Introduction 
In chapter two it is pointed out that the difficulties related to establishing whether 
attachment of movables to land has taken place through inaedificatio have led to the 
development of three different approaches by South African courts.1 The first 
approach, namely the traditional approach, is discussed in the previous chapter. In 
terms of the traditional approach three factors are used to determine whether 
attachment by inaedificatio has occurred. The three factors are the nature and object 
of the movable property, the manner and degree of attachment, and the intention of 
the annexor.2 
Chapter two also points out that recent case law and academic literature 
indicate that case law that is ordinarily associated with the supposed traditional 
approach considered the objective factors first to determine accession. The view is 
that the intention of the owner of the movable should only play a role when the 
objective factors are inconclusive to determine accession.3 However, it seems that 
various cases considered the intention of the owner of the movable as important 
from the beginning of the inquiry. Furthermore, although the intention of the owner of 
the movable was considered important, the objective factors were not decisive in any 
of these instances. 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss case law that is associated with the so-
called new approach. Academic commentators argue that, judging from recent case 
law, courts have shifted from the traditional approach to a new approach. They argue 
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that case law that is normally associated with the new approach places more 
emphasis on the intention of the owner (subjective intention) to ascertain whether 
attachment of the movable was intended to be permanent. 
Furthermore, the objective factors, namely the nature of the object and the 
manner of its attachment to an immovable, are only considered to determine whether 
the annexor or owner of the movable intended the attachment to be permanent in 
terms of the so-called new approach. Moreover, in certain instances the new 
approach gives priority to the intention of the owner of the movable (even when the 
owner was not the annexor).4 In the end, it seems that the case law that is 
associated with the new approach is not that different from the case law that is 
associated with the so-called traditional approach. Accordingly, academic 
commentators hold different views as far as the new approach is concerned. Some 
argue that the new approach is not really new,5 while others regard the new 
approach as both new and a justified departure from the traditional approach.6 There 
are also some authors who are completely against the new approach and therefore 
criticise it.7 They argue that the new approach is contrary to the rules of accession.8 
                                            
4
 Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A); Unimark 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 986 (T). 
5
 A Pope “Inaedificatio revisited: Looking backwards in search of clarity” (2011) 128 SALJ 123-146 
130-131 argues that “there is no principled difference between the so-called traditional and new 
approaches”. 
6
 C Lewis “Superficies solo cedit - sed quid est superficies?” (1979) 96 SALJ 94-107 103 supports the 
view that the intention of the owner of the movable should play an important role to determine 
inaedificatio, since an owner cannot lose ownership of his property without his consent except in 
limited circumstances. 
7
 I Knobel “Accession of movables to land: South African law and Dutch law” (2012) 45 CILSA 77-90 
81; LPW van Vliet “Accession of movables to land: II” (2002) 6 Edin LR 199-216 209-212; W 
Freedman “The test for inaedificatio: What role should the element of subjective intention play?” 
(2000) 117 SALJ 667-676; CG van der Merwe & JM Pienaar “The law of property (including real 
security)” 1999 ASSAL 290-293; B Maripe “Intention and the original acquisition of ownership: 
Whither inaedificatio?” (1998) 115 SALJ 544-552; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel 
(2
nd
 ed 1994) 72; A Breitenbach “Reflection on inaedificatio” (1985) 48 THRHR 462-465; DL Carey 
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Section 3 2 of this chapter outlines case law that is associated with what is 
known as the new approach to inaedificatio with the aim of identifying whether it is 
truly new. Section 3 3 sets out the role of the three factors that are relied on to 
determine whether a movable became attached to an immovable permanently in 
terms of the new approach. 
 
3 2 Case law associated with the new approach 
3 2 1 Post-1978 case law 
The new approach is said to have been developed in Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd 
& Another v Butcher Brothers Ltd9 (“Theatre Investments”) and in Melcorp SA (Pty) 
Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI)10 (“Melcorp”). According to Badenhorst, 
Pienaar and Mostert the courts adopted a new approach in these two judgments to 
determine whether movables had been attached to immovable property.11 Van der 
Merwe explains that Melcorp followed a trend that was already evident in Theatre 
Investments to invert the traditional order of the three factors that are relied on to 
identify inaedificatio by regarding the annexor’s intention as the most important 
factor.12 
In Theatre Investments the appellants (Theatre Investments) appealed against 
an interdict granted by the court a quo restraining them from removing certain 
                                                                                                                                       
Miller “Fixtures and auxiliary items: Are recent decisions blurring real rights and personal rights?” 
(1984) 101 SALJ 205-211. 
8
 See academic criticisms against the new approach in 4 3 below. 
9
 1978 (3) SA 682 (A). 
10
 1980 (2) SA 214 (W). 
11
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 149. 
12
 CG van der Merwe “The law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1980 ASSAL 230-233 
232-233. 
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equipment from a theatre.13 The appellants were the lessees of the building, which 
was owned by the respondent (lessor). The appellants had leased the building for a 
period of fifty years. In terms of the lease agreement, the appellants had a right of 
pre-emption to renew the lease for a further period of forty-nine years. Subsequent to 
the conclusion of the lease agreement, a theatre was erected upon the land and 
fitted out with seats, carpets, lighting, projection and air-conditioning equipment. The 
terms of the lease stipulated that upon expiry of the lease, ownership of all buildings 
and improvements would pass to the lessor and that no compensation would be 
payable to the lessee.14 
The parties failed to reach agreement to renew the lease. Upon expiry of the 
lease, a dispute arose in which the lessee claimed that certain items were movable. 
The lessee further contended that he remained the owner of such items and that he 
had the right to remove them from the theatre.15 The disputed items were the theatre 
seats, an emergency lighting plant, a projection room dimmer-board with ancillary 
fittings and attachments. The then Appellate Division of the Supreme Court had to 
determine whether these items were permanently attached to the land. According to 
the court the test is whether the annexor, at the time of attachment, intended that the 
movables should remain permanently attached.16 The court stated that evidence as 
to the annexor’s intention regarding the permanency of the attachment can be 
determined from various factors, including the annexor’s own evidence as to his 
intention (ipse dixit); the nature of the movable and of the immovable; the manner of 
annexation as well as the cause for and circumstances that gave rise to such 
annexation. 
                                            
13
 Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd & Another v Butcher Brothers Ltd 1978 (3) SA 682 (A) 685-686. 
14
 Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd & Another v Butcher Brothers Ltd 1978 (3) SA 682 (A) 685-686. 
15
 Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd & Another v Butcher Brothers Ltd 1978 (3) SA 682 (A) 685. 
16
 Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd & Another v Butcher Brothers Ltd 1978 (3) SA 682 (A) 688. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
53 
According to the court, the annexor’s ipse dixit as to his intention is not 
conclusive evidence, since it must be weighed together with the inferences drawn 
from the nature of the movable and the immovable, the manner of attachment as 
well as the cause for and circumstances that gave rise to attachment.17 The court 
stated further that, in the absence of evidence from the annexor, it will be 
constrained to determine accession based upon the inferences it may legitimately 
draw from the nature of the movable and the immovable, the manner of attachment 
as well as the cause for and circumstances that gave rise to such attachment. 
Accordingly, the court stated that it will, on consideration of all the evidence, direct 
and inferential, decide on a balance of probabilities whether the annexor intended 
permanent attachment of the movable to an immovable.18 In effect, this means that 
the first two objective factors (nature of the movable and immovable and the manner 
of attachment) become indications of the third, subjective factor (intention of the 
annexor), instead of being two of the three independent factors or, as some early 
cases suggested, two objective factors that are supplemented by the intention factor 
only when they are inconclusive. 
To establish whether the movable items19 were annexed with the intention to 
remain there permanently, the court took into consideration the intended duration of 
the original contract of lease; the possibility of renewing the lease; the fact that the 
building had been built to operate as a theatre; and the fact that the seats, 
emergency lighting and dimmer-board were essential equipment of the theatre.20 
                                            
17
 Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd & Another v Butcher Brothers Ltd 1978 (3) SA 682 (A) 688. 
18
 Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd & Another v Butcher Brothers Ltd 1978 (3) SA 682 (A) 688. 
19
 Namely the theatre seats, an emergency lighting plant, a projection room dimmer-board with 
ancillary fittings and attachments. 
20
 Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd & Another v Butcher Brothers Ltd 1978 (3) SA 682 (A) 691. 
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Accordingly, the court held that the items were intended to remain permanently 
attached to the building, and dismissed the appeal.21 
Academic authors hold different views regarding the decision of Theatre 
Investments.22 Their concerns are particularly directed at the factors from which 
evidence regarding the annexor’s intention was gathered by the court, including the 
annexor’s own evidence (ipse dixit). Lewis argues that Van Winsen AJA’s approach 
has altered in determining accession. According to Lewis the evidence of the 
annexor (who is also the owner of the movable) is now inferred from a number of 
factors, which amongst other things include his ipse dixit. Lewis argues that it seems 
that the courts would no longer be bound to consider the objective factors only if 
assessment of accession is inconclusive. 
The same argument is advanced by Maripe.23 He argues that the manner in 
which the court in Theatre Investments gathered evidence of the intention of the 
annexor indicates a change in approach, which is interesting, since this decision 
comes from the same judge, Van Winsen AJA, who established accession according 
to the traditional approach in Standard-Vacuum Refining Co v Durban City Council.24 
According to Maripe the ipse dixit of the “owner [who was also the annexor in this 
case] now becomes a factor from the outset, and not merely where the nature of the 
                                            
21
 Theatre Investments (Pty) Ltd & Another v Butcher Brothers Ltd 1978 (3) SA 682 (A) 691: 
According to Van Winsen AJA, “[i]t is difficult to avoid the conclusion that such items of equipment 
when they were attached to the building were intended to remain there indefinitely”. 
22
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 149-150; B Maripe “Intention and the original acquisition of ownership: Whither inaedificatio?” 
(1998) 115 SALJ 544-552 548; DL Carey Miller The acquisition and protection of ownership (1986) 
31; CG van der Merwe “The law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1980 ASSAL 230-233 
232. 
23
 B Maripe “Intention and the original acquisition of ownership: Whither inaedificatio?” (1998) 115 
SALJ 544-552 548. 
24
 1961 (2) SA 669 (A). 
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thing and manner of annexation are indecisive”.25 Van der Merwe argues that if the 
annexor’s intention is considered paramount, the status of the other factors, namely 
the nature of the movable and the manner of the annexation, “is reduced to mere 
factors which must (or may?) be taken into account” to establish whether accession 
has occurred.26 Therefore, according to the aforementioned authors, a shift had 
taken place in this decision away from the approach that considers the objective 
factors as important and towards a new approach that considers the intention of the 
annexor the most important factor. 
Carey Miller argues that an important question is how the test in Theatre 
Investments should be interpreted regarding the proper role of intention.27 He is of 
the view that, although the court considered the annexor’s intention as the point of 
departure in determining accession, it was the inferred intention, which the court 
determined on the basis of the physical circumstances.28 Carey Miller therefore 
argues that because the court viewed the annexor’s intention with reference to 
amongst other things the physical circumstances, the actual or subjective intention of 
the annexor was given a limited role.29 Carey Miller’s view differs from that of Lewis, 
Van der Merwe, and Maripe. According to Carey Miller, it seems that there was no 
real shift in approach by the court because the intention of the annexor of the 
movable played a limited role, since it was viewed with reference to the physical 
indications of attachment by the court. Also the court in Melcorp differed with Lewis’ 
view that the approach in Theatre Investments indicates a new approach on the part 
                                            
25
 B Maripe “Intention and the original acquisition of ownership: Whither inaedificatio?” (1998) 115 
SALJ 544-552 548. 
26
 CG van der Merwe “The law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1980 ASSAL 230-233 
232. 
27
 DL Carey Miller The acquisition and protection of ownership (1986) 31. 
28
 DL Carey Miller The acquisition and protection of ownership (1986) 31. 
29
 DL Carey Miller The acquisition and protection of ownership (1986) 31. 
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of the Appellate Division. According to McEwan J what transpired in Theatre 
Investment clarifies what has always been the approach. According to the judge this 
explains why the other earlier cases placed more emphasis on one (subjective 
factor) of the three factors than the other two factors (objective factors).30 Therefore, 
according to the court there is no shift in approach. 
According to Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert, the results of the approach 
followed in Theatre Investments case will not differ from the results that could be 
achieved by applying the three factors according to the traditional approach if “the 
movable is so securely attached to the immovable that separation must of necessity 
involve substantial injury”.31 They argue that if a movable is so securely attached to 
an immovable that “separation must of necessity involve substantial injury”, this “will 
still be a strong indication” of permanent attachment, which cannot be easily rebutted 
by the direct evidence of the annexor (ipse dixit).32 
However, the weight that is attached to the direct evidence (ipse dixit) of the 
intention of the annexor or owner of the movable has varied form case to case. In 
certain cases, the weight that is attached to the direct evidence of the annexor may 
produce undesirable conclusions33 and this is evident from the Melcorp case.34 
However, Melcorp differs from Theatre Investment in that the former involved a hire-
purchase agreement with reservation of ownership, whereas the latter dealt with a 
lease contract and therefore does not seem to be a good example of the so-called 
new approach. 
                                            
30
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 223. 
31
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 149. 
32
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 149. 
33
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 150. 
34
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W). 
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In Melcorp a company (the plaintiff) responsible for the sale, installation and 
maintenance of lifts concluded a hire-purchase contract with R Company for the 
supply and installation of two lifts in a building to be erected by R Company.35 The 
contract stipulated that all the apparatus installed in the building would remain 
movable and would not become fixtures until the full purchase price was paid. R 
Company financed the erection of the building by means of a mortgage loan that was 
granted by the defendant (bondholder).36 R Company encountered financial 
problems and consequently fell into arrears with its mortgage bond payments to the 
respondents as well as its obligation to pay the plaintiff in terms of the hire-purchase 
contract for installation of the lifts. Subsequently, the defendant caused the property 
to be sold in execution, at which auction the defendant itself purchased the property. 
It appears that before the sale took place the plaintiff had sent a copy of its hire-
purchase agreement with R Company to the defendant. It was alleged that the 
defendant received the copy but failed to read it. The plaintiff sought to enforce its 
right against the defendant to remove the lifts in terms of the contract. The defendant 
averred that the contract between the plaintiff and R Company only gave rise to 
personal rights, and that the lifts had subsequently became immovable by installation 
in the building. 
The question before the court was whether the lifts had become immovable as 
a result of their installation in the building. The court stated that the question whether 
the components of the lifts had acceded to the building is a question of fact that 
needs to be decided on the circumstances of the case.37 According to the court the 
elements to be considered when investigating whether a movable has become 
                                            
35
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 215. 
36
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 216. 
37
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 216. 
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permanently attached to land are the nature of the particular article, the degree and 
manner of its annexation, and the intention of the person annexing the movable.38 
To establish whether the lifts were permanently attached, the court analysed 
the evidence regarding the degree and manner of annexation.39 Following analysis 
of the evidence, the court held that there was no indication that the lifts were 
attached in such a manner that their removal would cause substantial injury to the 
building, and that the lifts could be separated from the building without any 
difficulties. Consequently, the degree and manner of the annexation of the lifts did 
not result in an unavoidable conclusion that the lift had been attached permanently. 
The defendant argued that the lifts were an integral part of the building, which 
could not be used for its intended purpose without the lifts. Furthermore, he argued 
that although the lifts could be removed from the building “without causing any 
damage, the intention behind its installation [could] only [have] be[en] that it should 
remain in the building with a degree of permanence”.40 The court upheld the 
defendant’s contention that the lifts were an integral part of the building. 
Nevertheless, the court came to the conclusion that the lifts remained movable.41 
According to the court, only “[i]f those facts stood alone it would be a proper and 
necessary inference that the person who installed the lifts intended them to form a 
permanent part of the structure and consequently that they acceded to it”.42 
However, since the person who installed the lifts stated in the contract that the lifts 
                                            
38
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 216-217. According 
to the court the above mentioned elements have always been followed and were elaborated on ever 
since. See also Olivier v Haarhof & Company 1906 TS 497 500-501; Macdonald Ltd v Radin NO and 
The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 466. 
39
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 217. 
40
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 220. 
41
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 150. 
42
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 222. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
59 
remained movable until payment of the full purchase price, the court could not hold 
that the lifts had become a permanent part of the buildings. 
Arguably, the court was primarily concerned with the intention of the plaintiff as 
expressed in the clause of a contract of sale that stated that the lifts remained 
movable until paid for in full.43 This was despite the fact that the court conceded that 
the nature of the lifts as well as their function as an integral part of the building 
suggested that they were intended to be attached to the building for permanent use. 
Nonetheless, it seems that the intention of the plaintiff as stated in the contract of 
sale (that the lifts were to remain movable until the purchase price was paid in full) 
contradicted the objective indications of accession, being the nature and function of 
the lifts as an integral part of the building. 
Therefore, the question that arose was whether the expressed intention of the 
plaintiff in the contract should overrule the intention to erect the lifts permanently (as 
inferred from the nature and function of the lifts in question).44 In what seems to be a 
response to this question, the court indicated that “the value of the so-called ipse 
dixit of the annexor … [should] vary from case to case”.45 The court stated that in 
certain cases it would be important to ascertain the so-called real intention inferred 
from the physical factors and not the professed intention as stated in the contract.46 
This means that in certain cases, the objective factors may be conclusive of the 
                                            
43
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 224. See also PJ 
Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
150. 
44
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 222. See also A 
Pope “Inaedificatio revisited: Looking backwards in search of clarity” (2011) 128 SALJ 123-146 142. 
45
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 223. 
46
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 223. 
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intention of the annexor of the movable property.47 For instance, the owner of 
cement who uses it or allows it to be used to build an immovable structure cannot 
rely on a reservation-of-ownership clause to contest the inference that his intention 
was for the cement to become part of the immovable structure.48 
The court stated that the subjective intention of the annexor of the lifts was 
clearly expressed from the beginning as a term in the contract.49 Consequently, the 
expressed term in the contract upon which the annexor was prepared to install the 
lifts was considered decisive and it overrode the nature and function of the lifts as an 
integral part of the building, which could not be used without the lifts.50 In Melcorp the 
court made it clear that if the lifts were not readily removable, the finding would have 
been different.51 This implies that if the lifts were not easily removable the court 
would have found that inaedificatio had taken place, and that the lifts accordingly 
formed part of the building. This raises the question whether this will always be the 
position if the nature and object of the movables point to accession, but the court 
ruled that the movables remained movable because ownership was reserved in the 
contract and because the movables were physically removable. 
                                            
47
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 223. McEwan J 
stated that “[i]n such event clearly any statement to the contrary by the annexor would be 
disregarded”. 
48
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 147. 
49
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 224. See also CG 
van der Merwe “The law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1980 ASSAL 230-233 231. 
50
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 224: “What is 
important in my opinion in the present case is that clause 14 of the contract is not an ipse dixit of the 
plaintiff made ex post facto, but embodies the very basis upon which the plaintiff was prepared to 
install the lifts in the building without prior payment therefor[e], including that the installation should 
not become a fixture until fully paid for. In the circumstances it appears to me that it would be quite 
artificial to impute a so-called ‘real’ intention to the plaintiff in conflict with such an unequivocally 
stated professed intention.” 
51
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 224. See also CG 
can der Merwe “The law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1980 ASSAL 230-233 231. 
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The remark made by the court that “it might be otherwise if the installation was 
… not readily removable” has also raised questions about sophisticated technology 
that can be used to remove movables that are permanently attached to an 
immovable.52 According to Van der Merwe, to decide whether accession has 
occurred by asking whether a movable can be readily removed without substantial 
injury to the immovable or movable has become “almost useless” because 
technology has become more advanced.53 He contends that it is only “in very 
extreme cases” where removal must necessarily cause damage to the immovable or 
movable. For instance, if cement and bricks are used to erect a building, removal will 
obviously cause damage to either the movable or immovable.54 By contrast, 
according to Van der Merwe, things like irrigation systems, stoves, doors and 
windows of a house can be removed with ease because of advanced technology. He 
suggests that, to determine whether accession has occurred, the test should be 
whether a movable is an integral part of an immovable, as was the case in 
Melcorp.55 This means that if a movable forms an integral part of an immovable, it 
should be regarded as part of the immovable regardless of whether its removal can 
be effected with ease due to technological developments. 
                                            
52
 Melcorp SA (Pty) Ltd v Joint Municipal Pension Fund (TvI) 1980 (2) SA 214 (W) 224. 
53
 CG van der Merwe “Things” in WA Joubert & JA Faris (eds) LAWSA 1
st 
reissue vol 27 (2002) para 
337; CG van der Merwe “The law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1990 ASSAL 214-216 
215-216; CG van der Merwe “The law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1980 ASSAL 230-
233 232-233. See also Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 986 
(T) 1008: According to the court “the question cannot be whether the structure can be removed at all 
because virtually everything is removable, and perhaps repairable, if blowtorches and other serious 
equipment are used”. 
54
 CG van der Merwe “The law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1980 ASSAL 230-233 
233. 
55
 CG van der Merwe “The law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1980 ASSAL 230-233 
233. 
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Van der Walt raises a further question regarding the expressed term in the 
contract of sale upon which the annexor was prepared to install the lifts.56 He argues 
that a question that remains unanswered in Melcorp is whether an intention not to 
permanently annex a movable would always override the objective factors when 
such an intention is expressed clearly in advance and made a condition for the 
attachment. Van der Walt contends that, if the answer is in the affirmative, the 
implication is that the annexor of the movable can always exclude the possibility of 
attachment by stating his intention to retain ownership in a contract beforehand.57 
However, removal of the property by the annexor must be physically possible without 
causing any damage to the immovable. In Melcorp the lifts were not difficult to 
remove. Hence, the court ordered that they were not immovable. Therefore, it seems 
as if there might be policy reasons in instances where ownership of the movables is 
reserved and the first two objective factors do not indicate that the movables are 
attached permanently. Policy considerations may induce the court to rule that 
accession did not occur to protect the interests of the owner of the movable who sold 
them to the owner of the land, but only inasmuch as the movables are easily 
removable from the land. 
 
3 2 2 Post-1990 case law 
Case law subsequent to Theatre Investments and Melcorp indicates a further 
development in the courts’ approach to accession. The first relevant case is Sumatie 
(Edms) Bpk v Venter NNO58 (“Sumatie”), in which the court did not follow the new 
                                            
56
 AJ van der Walt Law of property casebook for students (7
th
 ed 2009) 114. 
57
 AJ van der Walt Law of property casebook for students (7
th
 ed 2009) 114. 
58
 1990 (1) SA 173 (T). This case was also discussed in CG van der Merwe “The law of property 
(including mortgage and pledge)” 1990 ASSAL 214-216. 
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approach but a completely different approach to determine inaedificatio. This one is 
referred to as the omnibus approach. 
In Sumatie the plaintiff claimed delivery of two zinc and steel structures that had 
been erected on the property of one Olivier. Olivier’s estate was sequestrated and 
vested in the defendants in their capacity as joint trustees of the insolvent estate. 
The plaintiff contended that the structures were movables and that he had remained 
the owner. He sought an order to enter the property and remove the structures. The 
plaintiff alleged that, since he remained the owner of the structures, he could enforce 
his rei vindicatio.59 The defendants opposed the claim and contended that the 
structures had acceded to the land and hence had become part of the insolvent 
estate. The question before the court was whether the structures had acceded to the 
land through inaedificatio and thus became part of the insolvent estate. The court 
examined Roman and Roman-Dutch authorities and concluded that, to establish 
whether the structures had become part of the land through inaedificatio, the primary 
investigation is to determine whether the purpose (causa) of the attachment 
indicates that the thing was attached permanently or indefinitely in such a manner 
that it formed a new separate entity with the land and became immovable itself. 
According to the court, the purpose or causa of the attachment could be determined 
in light of the following factors: 
a) The nature and function of the attached property; 
b) the manner of attachment; 
c) the subjective intention or aim of the attachment at the time of the 
attachment; 
                                            
59
 Sumatie (Edms) Bpk v Venter NNO 1999 (2) SA 986 (T) 174. See also CG van der Merwe “The law 
of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1990 ASSAL 214-216. 
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d) the act or conduct of the owner of the attachment; and 
e) any other relevant facts or circumstances. 
 
The court indicated that in the event of contradictions or uncertainties regarding the 
applicable factors, the purpose (causa) should be resolved on a balance of 
probabilities.60 
The court applied the abovementioned factors to the facts of the case and 
concluded that the nature of the structures indicated that they were intended to be 
permanent and that the structures’ function as a storage for a guava juice factory 
also indicated that they were intended to be permanent.61 The court further found 
that the manner of attachment indicated that the structures were fixed to the land 
and had become permanent in nature. According to the court, if the structures were 
removed, there would have been considerable damage and increase in cost, since 
sophisticated equipment such as pneumatic drills, cranes and graders were required 
to remove the structures. 
The court further stated that, although there was evidence that the structures 
were erected temporarily, the plaintiff had taken no steps to remove the structures. 
Furthermore, the lease in respect of the land on which the structures were erected 
indicated that they were erected for an indeterminate period and it was not indicated 
in the lease that the structures should be erected in such a manner that they could 
easily be removed. Accordingly, the court held that the purpose (or causa) of the 
attachment of the structures was that they should attach to the land permanently or 
for an indeterminate period. Therefore, according to the court the structures were 
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attached in such a manner that they formed a new separate entity with the land. The 
court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim. 
The so-called omnibus approach proposed in Sumatie was not followed in 
subsequent case law.62 For instance, in Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm 
Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk63 (“Konstanz”) the court considered the decision of 
Macdonald Ltd v Radin NO and The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd64 
(“Macdonald”) and held that the intention of the owner of the movable, and not of the 
annexor, had to be considered to establish whether accession had occurred.65 In 
Konstanz the manager of the appellant’s farm concluded a contract with Pumps for 
Africa (a close corporation) to set up an irrigation and circulation system on the farm. 
Pumps for Africa purchased the components of the system from the respondent. The 
agreement was that the respondent remained the owner of the equipment until full 
payment of the purchase price by Pumps for Africa. Once the system was installed 
on the farm, the appellant paid Pumps for Africa, but Pumps for Africa did not pay 
the respondent for the equipment. The respondent obtained default judgment against 
Pumps for Africa.66 
The court ordered that Pumps for Africa should return the equipment and, 
should payment not be made within ten days of the judgment, the Deputy Sheriff was 
authorised to attach and remove the equipment. Pumps for Africa did not comply 
                                            
62
 Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A). See also CG 
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 1915 AD 454 466. 
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 Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A) 276. See also 
LPW van Vliet “Accession of movables to land: II” (2002) 6 Edin LR 199-216 206-207. 
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with the order of the court and the Deputy Sheriff’s return indicated that he had 
attached the equipment but had not removed them, since they were attached to the 
land. Subsequently, the appellant brought an application for a rescission of the 
judgment that authorised the Sheriff of the court to attach the equipment and remove 
it from his land. The appellant further applied for an order declaring him to be the 
owner of the equipment attached to his land.67 
The appellant and the respondent agreed before the former’s application was 
heard that the latter’s claim would be based on the rei vindicatio, and that any order 
that the court would make should have the legal consequences of the rei vindicatio. 
The two main issues that the court a quo had to decide were whether the equipment 
had become part of the appellant’s land by inaedificatio, and if not, whether the 
respondent was precluded by estoppel from relying on the reservation-of-ownership 
clause.68 The court a quo decided in favour of the respondent and ordered the 
appellant to allow the respondent to remove the equipment. Subsequently, the 
appellant appealed against the judgment of the court a quo. 
The question revolved around whose intention must be considered to establish 
whether a movable was attached to land to the extent that it became permanent. 
However, the court did not rule on the question regarding intention, since the 
appellant did not argue against the view that the intention of the owner of the 
movable should play a role to determine inaedificatio. It appears that the court a quo 
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 Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A). 
68
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followed the approach in Macdonald and considered the intention of the owner of the 
movables to decide whether accession had occurred.69 
Conversely, on appeal the appellant contended that the nature and manner in 
which the irrigation system had been attached indicated that the irrigation system 
had been attached permanently and that it was not necessary to consider the 
intention of the owner of the movable to investigate whether the irrigation system 
was attached to land with the intention that it should remain there permanently.70 
Furthermore, the appellant argued that, although the intention of the respondent had 
to be considered, the respondent had in any event associated himself with the 
permanent attachment of the irrigation system to the appellant’s property.71 
According to the court, since the appellant did not argue that the approach in 
Macdonald should be reconsidered, the court had to accept that the test in 
Macdonald was still applicable.72 Interestingly, the court seems to have accepted the 
position in Macdonald, viz that the intention of the owner of the movable was 
important to establish whether a movable is attached to land permanently. However, 
the court in Konstanz held that this position might be reconsidered in future in view of 
the criticism by academic commentators.73 The court therefore suggested that it 
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 Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A) 284. See also 
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 Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A) 283. 
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 Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A) 284. 
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 Konstanz Properties (Pty) Ltd v Wm Spilhaus en Kie (WP) Bpk 1996 (3) SA 273 (A) 282. 
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Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
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st 
reissue vol 27 (2002) 
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might be time to reconsider which approach is appropriate and whose intention is 
relevant to establish accession.74 
Nonetheless, the court followed the decision in Macdonald and held that the 
intention of the owner of the movable is still relevant to the question of inaedificatio.75 
Accordingly, the intention of the owner of the movable was relevant despite the fact 
that the respondent was not the annexor of the irrigation system.76 Furthermore, the 
court dismissed the appellant’s contention that the court had to consider only the 
nature and the manner in which the irrigation system was attached to land because it 
indicated that the irrigation system had been attached permanently. The court 
rejected this argument on the ground that it would be leaning towards the traditional 
as opposed to the new approach.77 Consequently, the court held that inaedificatio 
had not occurred because the respondent had stated clearly in the hire-purchase 
contract that he would remain the owner of the irrigation system until payment in full 
of the purchase price. Also, the items in question were not impossible to remove.78 
Accordingly, the appeal based on inaedificatio was dismissed. 
Van Vliet argues that the approach followed in Konstanz logically entails that 
reserving ownership of the movables in the contract of sale would preclude 
accession of those movables to land, even if the movables are substantially 
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incorporated into land.79 However, there has not been any conclusion in case law 
that a substantial incorporation of a movable to land can be overridden by the stated 
intention of the owner of a movable in a contract. What is clear in case law is that, if 
there is controversy with regard to accession and the movable can readily be 
detached from the land, the courts consider the intention of the owner of the movable 
to determine accession only if the intention to reserve ownership (generally for 
security purposes) was stated beforehand in the contract of sale.80 In that regard, 
courts could decide that accession did not take place probably for policy reasons. 
However, this may also mean that people will now intentionally attach movables in 
such a way that they can be easily removed. 
As was pointed out earlier in this chapter,81 the weight that the courts attach to 
the stated intention may lead to unsatisfactory outcomes. However, it appears in the 
cases discussed so far that the stated intention of the owner conflicts with the nature 
and object of the movable and not the degree and manner of attachment of the 
movable. This is because in most cases where the courts have held that the 
intention of the owner of the movable was important, the manner and degree of 
attachment did not indicate permanent attachment although the nature and object of 
the movable indicated that the movable was intended to serve the land permanently. 
Nonetheless, the view that the stated intention of the owner of the movable may 
conflict with the objective indicators led the court in Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v 
                                            
79
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Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd82 to hold that the stated or professed intention of the 
owner of the movable cannot be the only factor even though it is the most important 
factor that needs to be considered to establish whether accession has occurred. 
According to the court, all other relevant factors must be considered to determine 
accession. 
The plaintiff in Unimark installed chip-core wall partitions and ceilings, an alarm 
system, an intercom system, an electrical system, a steel undercover parking area, a 
steel canopy, steel security gates, air conditioners, carpet tiles, a kitchen sink and 
fire extinguishers.83 When the plaintiff was evicted from the property, it sought to 
recover the items that it had installed on the premises.84 The defendant argued that 
the items claimed by the plaintiff had acceded to its factory by means of inaedificatio 
and hence they were no longer owned by the plaintiff.85 The question before the 
court was whether the items in question indeed had acceded to the premises. The 
court stated that a number of factors had to be taken into account to determine 
whether a movable thing that is affixed to an immovable has lost its identity and 
became an integral part of the immovable.86 
According to the court the professed intention of the owner of the movable 
cannot be the only factor, since his intention as the owner is not necessarily 
credible.87 Moreover, the court stated that although the owner can contend that he 
did have the intention that the movable should remain movable, that intention will not 
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necessarily be real or possible to condone. Accordingly, the owner’s intention has to 
be determined and judged within the context of all the relevant facts.88 
In that regard the court stated that if the nature of the thing and the manner of 
its attachment are inconclusive, the elements of reasonableness, common sense, or 
the prevailing standards of the society must be invoked. According to the court, the 
question cannot only be what the specific individual intended or believed to be 
possible or feasible, regardless of all objective facts, but also how society, or a 
reasonable member of society, would view the situation.89 
The court held that the exposition of the above principles is in line with the 
approach of the other Appellate Division judgments and that it had to be applied to 
the facts of this case.90 However, before the court decided whether the items 
became immovable, it stated that in order to view the annexed property and the 
manner of attachment in the correct perspective, it is not only the nature of the 
annexed items that is relevant to investigate accession, but also the nature of the 
immovable property.91 
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On the basis of the above arguments the court held that the undercover parking 
area was immovable because it could not be removed without causing damage to 
the components. Interestingly, the court stated that the question was not whether the 
structure could be removed at all because “virtually everything is ultimately 
removable, and perhaps repairable, if blowtorches and other serious equipment are 
used”.92 According to the court this is an example where the subjective intention of 
the owner has to be judged within the context of and subject to the prevailing 
objective standards. 
With regard to the canopy the court held that it could not simply be unbolted, 
that it was welded to the building and seemed to be part of it, and thus it had 
acceded to the main building.93 The steel gates were regarded as immovable 
because they were welded to the steel door frames and the kitchen sink was found 
to have become immovable upon installation. The floor carpet tiles were also held to 
have acceded to the building because it is unlikely that the intention was to remove 
them and use them elsewhere, since floor tiles are used to cover a floor in the 
normal run of things.94 However, with regard to the chip-core wall partitions and 
vinyl-clad ceilings, the court judged the intention of the owner at the time of 
attachment and stated that 
“the plaintiff's occupation of the premises was based on a lease agreement for 
five years with an option to renew (between the lessor and the lessee) and an 
option to purchase was expressly ruled out when the sublease to Redgwoods 
was permitted … and no objective facts indicate that [t]his would have been 
impossible or unreasonably difficult … [and] it appears that the plaintiff wanted to 
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remove the office partitioning, especially after the agreed compensation fell 
through.”
95 
The court considered the above facts and decided on a balance of probabilities that 
the chip-core wall partitions and vinyl-clad ceilings were not intended to accede to 
the immovable property, and thus remained movable.96 The court referred to the 
alarm system as an integral part of the house, but held that it could not be an integral 
part of a factory warehouse, “which is leased out and adapted to suit changing 
needs”.97 Accordingly, the court concluded that the alarm system was not 
immovable.98 
According to Freedman, the judge in this case should have followed the 
decisions of the Appellate Division, since the Transvaal Provincial Division was 
bound by the former judgments of the same court.99 However, Van der Westhuizen 
AJ explained that 
“[the] court, [was] of course, bound to follow the decisions of the Appellate 
Division and has no desire to deviate from those. Perhaps an attempt could be 
made, not necessarily to formulate new and better ‘tests’ or ‘criteria’, but to gain 
a better understanding of the law as laid down by the Courts, from the 
perspective of logic and common sense, rather than from the old authorities-
based criticism of textbook authors.”
100
 
Although Van der Westhuizen AJ pointed out that the court did not formulate a new 
test or criteria to determine accession, one could still argue that the court introduced 
new elements that may be considered to determine accession. Moreover, the 
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Transvaal Provincial Division is a lower court and should have been bound by 
previous decisions of the Appellate Division. 
 
3 2 3 Concluding remarks 
It can be concluded from the preceding discussion that courts increasingly 
emphasise the intention of the owner/annexor of the movable in determining whether 
accession has occurred. As a point of departure, the court in Theatre Investments 
determined whether accession had occurred by enquiring whether the annexor of the 
movables had attached the movables with the intention that they should remain there 
permanently. The court gathered the evidence of the intention of the annexor from, 
amongst other things, the annexor’s ipse dixit and the contractual relationship 
between the parties (terms of the lease agreement). The court stated that the lease 
contract “provided a context within which” attachment was viewed.101 
Logically, the court in Theatre Investments should have gathered the evidence 
of the annexor’s intention from the objective indications of attachment to determine 
whether accession had occurred. Theatre Investments follows a trend evidenced in 
some earlier cases that considered the intention of the owner of the movable as 
more important. However, although the stated intention of the owner was considered 
as important in various earlier cases, the objective factors were not ignored 
completely. Hence, in Theatre Investment the court considered the stated intention 
(in the form of the annexor’s ipse dixit) with the objective factors in mind and held 
that accession had occurred. 
Melcorp placed considerable weight on the annexor’s ipse dixit (as stated in the 
hire-purchase contract) to arrive at the conclusion that the lifts remained movable 
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until the purchase price was fully paid. It is arguable that the basis for the Melcorp 
judgment was the parties’ agreement, particularly the reservation-of-ownership 
clause. This was despite the lifts’ function, which indicated that the lifts were installed 
with the intention that they should remain there permanently and therefore formed an 
integral part of the building.102 However, an analysis of Melcorp suggests that the 
court interpreted the objective factors of accession with reference to the stated 
subjective intention of the annexor of the lifts in the contract to determine whether 
inaedificatio had taken place. Consequently, since the lifts were removable from the 
buildings (coupled with the fact that ownership was reserved in the contract until the 
lifts were paid for in full) the court held that the lifts remained movable. 
The position in Melcorp also follows the trend evidenced in earlier case law, 
which considered the stated intention of the owner of the movable as the most 
important factor. However, the objective factors did not conclude that the lifts were 
permanent, although the nature and function of the lifts indicated the intention to 
attach them permanently to the building.103 Therefore, it seems that the court’s 
decision to order removal of the lifts was based on policy reasons (to protect the 
owner of the lifts) because the owner of the lifts had not yet paid the full purchase 
price. 
Post-1990 case law indicates a further development in the courts’ approach to 
determine whether accession has taken place. The case of Sumatie developed a 
completely different approach, namely an omnibus approach. Therefore, Sumatie is 
an outlier and should probably be ignored, since it did not find any favour with the 
Appellate Division in subsequent cases. Nonetheless, cases subsequent to Sumatie 
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continued to emphasise the subjective intention of the owner of the movable. In 
Konstanz the court followed the decision in Macdonald and indicated that the 
intention of the owner of the movables had to be considered to ascertain whether 
accession had occurred. The court in Konstanz went further than Macdonald and 
emphasised that the intention of the owner is not merely important but in fact 
decisive to determine whether accession had occurred. Accordingly, the court 
concluded that inaedificatio did not take place because the contract provided for the 
retention of ownership of the system by the owner until the full purchase price was 
paid. 
In Unimark the court emphasised the intention of the owner of the movable, but 
also introduced new elements for determining accession. The court stated that the 
question cannot only be what the specific individual intended or believed to be 
possible or feasible, regardless of all objective facts, but also how society, or a 
reasonable member of the society, would view the situation (publicity principle).104 
The decision in Unimark contradicts the decisions of the other Appellate Division 
decisions. Since the Transvaal Provincial Division in Unimark arguably should have 
been bound by previous decisions of the Appellate Division, Unimark is also an 
outlier case and probably not authoritative. 
Be that as it may, if the dicta from the cases discussed above are anything to 
go by, one can conclude that, if the movables cannot be removed from the land 
without causing any damage to the land, the courts will not order removal of the 
movables even though ownership might have been reserved as a security for 
payment of the purchase price. Moreover, the courts’ approach in the cases 
discussed above is not truly new because it has been coming along since before 
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1978.105 In Melcorp McEwan J held that what transpired in Theatre Investment 
clarifies what has always been the approach in case law. Nonetheless, it is only the 
courts’ reliance on the owner of the movable’s ipse dixit that seems to be new. 
 
3 3 Role of the three factors in the new approach 
It appears from the case law discussed in the preceding section that the three factors 
originally used to test for permanent attachment of movables to immovable property 
(namely the nature and object of the movable property, the degree and manner of 
attachment, and the intention of the annexor) are still applied in the new approach to 
inaedificatio. The first factor, the nature and object of the movable, still applies to the 
extent that the movable must in its nature be capable of acceding to the immovable, 
as was the position in the early case law that is associated with what is known as the 
traditional approach.106 Building materials like cement and bricks are by their nature 
and purpose capable of acceding to land. In Unimark the court held that steel 
security gates, which were welded to steel door frames, were by their nature capable 
of acceding to land. The court in that case added that 
“[n]ot only the nature of the annexed items is relevant, but also the nature of the 
immovable structure to which these were annexed, in order to see the nature of 
the annexed items and the manner of attachment in the correct perspective.”107 
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Therefore, it seems that it is not only the nature of the movable that needs to be 
considered to establish whether it is permanently attached to an immovable, but also 
the nature of the immovable property. Moreover, the nature and object of the 
movable must not only be indicative of its accession to land but the movable should 
also be attached to the land with the object of serving it on a permanent basis.108 For 
instance, in Konstanz the court accepted that the irrigation system was destined to 
serve the land and to become a permanent part of the farm physically, economically 
and functionally.109 In Sumatie the court also held that “the nature of [the zinc and 
steel] structure was such that it could indeed have been a permanent attachment 
while its function, namely to serve as a store for a guava juice factory, was just as 
reconcilable with a permanent attachment”.110 However, although the nature and 
object may indicate that a movable was destined to serve the land permanently it 
seems that it would not become immovable as long as ownership is reserved in the 
contract and coupled with the fact that the movable is still movable. 
To determine whether a movable is by nature capable of being attached 
permanently to land, the integration test is applied.111 As was pointed out earlier,112 
the integration test was also applied in earlier case law that followed the traditional 
approach. This test asks whether a movable is “structurally integrated” into or “part of 
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the fabric” of the immovable property.113 As was the case in the so-called traditional 
approach, it seems that the integration test in the new-approach cases does not 
consider the manner in which the movable functions when deciding whether it has 
become part of the immovable. Accordingly, in the new approach functional or 
economic integration is still not adequate to change a movable into an immovable, 
even though the movable was attached to an immovable.114 This is evident in the 
case of Melcorp, where the court held that the lifts formed an integral part of the 
building in a functional sense but nonetheless remained movable.115 
Moreover, complex things that are attached to immovable property will not 
become immovable under the integration test if they are not structurally incorporated 
into the immovable.116 For instance, in Konstanz the sprinkler system, which was the 
third part of the main irrigation system, was held to be movable, although it 
functioned together with the main parts of the irrigation system, which were held to 
have become immovable through attachment.117 Therefore, in Konstanz the third 
part of the irrigation system would have been immovable had it been structurally 
incorporated with the main parts of the irrigation system, since the integration test 
requires structural incorporation of the movables with the immovable. 
In case law associated with the new approach, the second factor (the degree 
and manner of attachment) still focuses on the manner in which the movable had 
been attached to the land. If the movable is attached to land by sufficient means, it 
therefore becomes part of the land. The test is whether the movable can be removed 
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without causing damage to itself or the land.118 If the movable can be removed but 
only with considerable damage to itself or to the land, it would indicate that the 
movable had become part of the land through inaedificatio. Recently, in Opperman v 
Stanely and Another119 the court held that a weighbridge and two augers were not 
immovable or fixed to the land because there was no reason to believe that their 
removal would cause irreparable damage to the land.120 It seems that a movable 
would not become permanently attached to the land if it is removable from such land. 
Therefore, if ownership of the movable was reserved courts would decide that 
accession did not take place and the movable still belongs to the owner. 
As pointed out above,121 Van der Merwe argues that it has become “almost 
useless” to decide whether accession has occurred by asking whether a movable 
can be readily removed without substantial injury to the immovable or the 
movable.122 This is because technology has become so sophisticated that practically 
anything can be removed from immovable property without damage. He suggests 
that the test should be whether the movable has become an integral part of the 
immovable, as was the case in Melcorp.123 
The third factor (the intention at the time of the annexation) asks whether the 
movable was attached to the land with the intention that it should remain there 
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permanently.124 The new-approach cases focus on the intention of the owner of the 
movable, as some early cases did, instead of the intention of the person who has 
attached the movable to the land.125 However, if the annexor was the owner of the 
movable at the time of the attachment, his intention would be considered to establish 
whether accession had occurred.126 According to Van der Merwe, the third factor 
should not be concerned with the intention of the owner of the movable but the 
intention of the annexor at the time when the movable was attached to the land.127 
It was explained earlier that intention as a factor for determining whether 
accession had taken place may be relevant in either one of two forms, namely the 
intention that can be inferred from the first two objective factors and the stated or 
professed intention as it is indicated in the purchase contract.128 The intention that is 
inferred from the combination of the two objective factors is referred to as the 
objective intention.129 The intention as stated in the contract is referred to as the 
subjective intention. The subjective intention of the owner of the movable seems to 
play a prominent role in the new approach, as it did in some earlier cases associated 
with the traditional approach. 
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Mostert et al argue that the intention that is relevant to investigate accession 
should be the intention at the time of the annexation, which is logically inferred from 
the physical factors (objective intention) and not the stated intention in the 
contract.130 However, the sale of movables through instalment sale agreements, 
where parties agree to reserve ownership until full payment of the purchase price, 
seems to have resulted in the subjective intention, as stated in the contract, being 
the primary consideration used by the courts to determine accession in the so-called 
new approach.131 It seems that if parties agree beforehand that the movable will not 
form a permanent part of the land before payment of the full purchase price, the 
stated subjective intention of the owner is considered the most important factor to 
determine whether accession has occurred. According to the courts the stated 
subjective intention of the owner of the movables will not be ignored to determine 
whether accession has occurred, because he cannot be deprived of ownership 
without his consent.132 
Therefore, it seems that under the new approach, contractual reservation of 
ownership, coupled with the fact that the movable can be removed from the land with 
ease, is still an indication that the owner of the movable did not intend the movable 
to become a permanent part of the land.133 A question that arises is what the position 
would be if the stated intention accords with the movable being removable with ease 
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from the land, but conflicts with the nature and object of such a movable. In this 
regard the courts are likely to hold that accession did not occur, especially if the 
ownership of the movable property was reserved in the contract along with the fact 
that the movable could be removed from the land with ease.134 
However, it is not entirely clear from the case law whether the stated (or 
subjective) intention of the owner of the movable will always be considered decisive, 
even when the objective factors indicate that accession has occurred. This is 
because in some cases, although the objective factors may point decisively to 
accession, the intention of the owner of the movable is still considered decisive in 
concluding that accession did not occur. For instance, in De Beers Consolidated 
Mines Ltd v Ataqua Mining (Pty) Ltd135 (“De Beers”) the court held that the tailings 
dump was movable on the basis that the owner did not intend for it to accede to the 
land.136 Having regard to the nature and the size of the tailings dump in the De Beers 
case, one can hardly argue that the tailings dump was movable in its nature. 
However, the uncertainties surrounding the role of intention seem to have led 
the court in Unimark to state that the professed intention of the owner of the movable 
cannot be the only factor to determine accession, even though it is the most 
important factor in this regard.137 In Unimark it was held that the owner’s intention 
must be determined and judged within the context of all the relevant facts. 
Accordingly, the court stated that the elements of reasonableness, common sense, 
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or the prevailing standards of society had to be invoked to determine whether the 
intention of the owner of the movable was credible.138 Similarly, in Opperman v 
Stanely and Another139 the court held that the issue had to be decided in each case 
on its own facts and added that it had to be decided with a “liberal sprinkling of 
common sense, fairness and practicality”, and that the principle of justice between 
man and man should also come into play.140 
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the three factors that are 
used to determine inaedificatio are still applied in the so-called new approach, albeit 
with more emphasis on the subjective intention, particularly in cases where 
movables are sold subject to a reservation of ownership. It seems in cases of 
reservation of ownership that courts may order that accession did not take place 
provided that the movables can be removed without significant damage. 
 
3 4 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss case law that is associated with what is known 
as the new approach when determining inaedificatio. The post-1978 cases indicate 
that the courts have adopted an approach that some earlier South African cases 
followed to determine whether a movable had become permanently attached to land. 
In the decisions of Theatre Investments and Melcorp there are indications that the 
courts considered the intention of the annexor of the movable to establish accession. 
However, it appears from the aforementioned cases that the annexor was also at the 
same time the owner of the movable. Accordingly, the objective factors served as the 
                                            
138
 See 3 2 2 above. As was indicated earlier, Unimark should be treated with care because is an 
outlier case. 
139
 [2010] ZAGPPHC 221 (09 December 2010). 
140
 Opperman v Stanely and Another [2010] ZAGPPHC 221 (09 December 2010) para 15. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
85 
factors from which the intention of the annexor could be inferred, which according to 
the court had to be weighed against the annexor’s own evidence as to his intention 
(his ipse dixit). Therefore, if the annexor had stated in the contract that his intention 
was to retain ownership of the movable until full payment of the purchase price, it 
appears that he was allowed to detach his property if it could be removed with ease. 
The chapter also outlines a further development in post-1990 case law. Most 
important is the Konstanz case in which the court held that, to determine 
inaedificatio, one must consider the intention of the owner of the movable and not 
the intention of the annexor. Konstanz went even further and stated that the intention 
of the owner of the movable is not merely important, but in fact decisive. The reason 
advanced for this view is that an owner could not lose ownership of his property 
without an intention to pass ownership. This position therefore remains the same as 
in earlier case law, but the court in Konstanz stated that to regard the intention of the 
owner of the movable as an important element for accession might be reconsidered 
in the future. 
The chapter further lays out the role of the three factors in the new approach. It 
establishes that the three factors that the traditional approach applied in the earlier 
case law are still applied in more recent case law, and that the subjective or stated 
intention still takes priority over the other factors, as was the case in some of the 
other early cases. This mostly occurred in cases where movables were sold in terms 
of instalment-sale agreements whereby the parties agreed to reserve ownership of 
the movable with the seller until payment of the purchase price. The interests of the 
owner of the movable are protected in such cases. Therefore, if the movable can be 
removed without damage and ownership is reserved, the court may order that a 
movable should be removed even though it became an integral part of an 
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immovable. The rationale behind the emphasis of the intention of the owner seems 
to be policy reasons. Accordingly, when ownership of the movable is reserved by the 
owner the courts seem to hold that the property remains movable until the conditions 
of the reservation of ownership are fulfilled. 
There seems to be policy reasons for the emphasis placed on the owner’s 
subjective intention. Therefore, in the next chapter I discuss and assess the 
implications for considering the subjective intention of the owner of the movable as 
the most important factor in determining accession with the aim to examine whether 
the result is justified in view of section 25 of the Constitution of the Republic South 
African, 1996. 
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Chapter 4: Assessment and implications 
 
4 1 Introduction 
The object of this chapter is to discuss and assess the implications of the 
conclusions from the previous chapters, particularly the tendency of the courts in 
certain decisions to override the objective factors and focus primarily on the stated 
intention of the owner of the movable to determine whether or not accession had 
taken place. As a point of departure, section 4 2 summarises the main conclusions 
from chapters two and three. The focus in this overview is on the question whether 
there is sufficient evidence from the case law to conclude that the courts had in fact 
shifted from the traditional to the new approach. After this summary of the 
conclusions of the previous chapters, section 4 3 discusses academic criticisms 
against the so-called new approach; as appears there, much of this criticism is 
relevant to the conclusions and assessment in this chapter. Section 4 4 sets out 
possible justifications for the so-called new approach, again because some of these 
justifications are relevant to the conclusions in this chapter. Finally, section 4 5 
assesses whether the conclusions reached in this chapter have any constitutional 
implications. 
 
4 2 Summary of conclusions from the previous chapters 
Chapter two analyses case law that is associated with what is usually described as 
the traditional approach in determining whether inaedificatio had taken place. The 
chapter commences with the definition of inaedificatio and a brief overview of its 
historical background. The principles relating to inaedificatio have their origins in 
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Roman law and were received into Roman-Dutch and South African law.1 The early 
South African cases were faced with the question: what constitutes permanent 
attachment of movables to land by inaedificatio? It is argued in chapter two that this 
question was never central in Roman law. Instead, the focus was on the remedies 
available to either party and not on the question of whether or when accession had 
taken place. Nevertheless, it is assumed that in Roman law the objective, physical 
factors were the only indications of accession of movables to land and the same can 
be postulated for Roman-Dutch law.2 
Chapter two describes how case law that is usually associated with the so-
called traditional approach applies the three factors that the court identified in 
Olivier.3 Some of the early cases indicate that the first two objective factors may be 
evident from the beginning of the inquiry whether accession had occurred, and that 
the first two factors are examined with the object of arriving at the objective (inferred) 
intention to attach permanently (or not, as the case may be). If the results of 
examining the objective factors and inferred intention are inconclusive as to whether 
accession had occurred, the stated or actual intention of the person who brought 
about the attachment (or, in some instances, the owner of the movable; the two may 
or may not be the same person) is considered.4 Since the owner of the movable was 
often also the person who brought about the attachment, the case law does not 
make a clear and principled distinction between considering the stated intention of 
the one rather than the other. The objective factors are seemingly always important 
determinants for accession in terms of the traditional approach. Accordingly, the 
stated or actual intention of the owner of the movable is only considered when the 
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objective factors are inconclusive of whether inaedificatio had taken place. Since this 
seems to have been the approach in the majority of early cases, it became 
customary to associate what has since been described as the traditional approach 
with the tendency to focus on the first two objective factors and to resort to the actual 
stated intention (of either the person who made the attachment or the owner of the 
movable) only if the objective factors are inconclusive. 
However, chapter two also reveals that some of the early cases, including an 
important decision such as Macdonald, considered the stated or actual intention of 
the owner of the movable as a crucial factor to determine whether accession had 
occurred. I argue in chapter two that what emerged in Macdonald and some of the 
other early cases contradicts the notion that only recent case law is to be associated 
with the so-called new approach, which considers the stated or actual intention of the 
owner of the movable as the most important factor.5 Nonetheless, although it is true 
that various early cases considered the stated intention of the owner of the movable, 
significantly the objective factors in those cases were in fact not conclusive of 
attachment and therefore – according to my view – the courts’ approach in cases like 
Macdonald did not conflict with the traditional approach to inaedificatio, which 
requires sufficient attachment of a movable to land according to objective factors. At 
least some of the older cases that seem to indicate that the stated intention is 
important do not necessarily indicate a shift from the objective to the subjective 
factor because in those cases the objective factors were sufficiently inconclusive to 
justify the courts’ resorting to evidence about the subjective intention. 
However, it remains true that the stated or actual intention (as opposed to the 
objective intention) of the owner of the movable (as opposed to the intention of the 
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person who made the attachment) is considered important even in some of the older 
decisions that are usually associated with the so-called traditional approach. 
Significantly, this is most evident in cases where the attached movable was subject 
to a credit sale with reservation of ownership and was reasonably easily removable 
from the land.6 Determining whether accession had taken place always depends on 
the circumstances of each case, and this is true of the older cases as well. Notably, 
in some early cases it was held that movables had become attached to the 
immovable property even though they were removable from the land with ease. 
Again, significantly, this occurred in cases that did not involve a credit sale of the 
movables subject to reservation of ownership. In these cases the courts held that the 
movables had been attached to the land even though the owner of the movable’s 
intention might have indicated the contrary.7 For instance, in Van Wezel v Van 
Wezel’s8 Trustee the court held that a windmill (which was not a subject of credit 
sale) was immovable although it could be removed from the land with relative ease. 
Similarly, in Gault v Behrman9 the court held that the stove (which was not a subject 
of credit sale) was immovable although it was clear that it could be removed with 
ease. It would seem, therefore, that the decisive factor that nudged decisions like 
Macdonald towards the conclusion that accession did not take place was not just the 
fact that the objective factors were inconclusive (the movables were easily 
removable), but also the fact that the movable was subject to a reservation of 
ownership provision in a credit sale. 
From chapter two one can conclude that the early case law that is usually 
associated with the so-called traditional approach determined whether accession 
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had taken place with reference to the three factors identified in Olivier, based on the 
circumstances of each case. In the majority of cases, the tendency seems to have 
been to decide the case based on the first two, objective factors and to resort to the 
stated intention of either the annexor or the owner of the movable (with no clear 
distinction between them) only if the first two factors were inconclusive. This 
observation has become associated with the so-called traditional approach. 
However, in cases that involved attachment of movables that were subject to a credit 
sale agreement with reservation of ownership of the movable there are signs of a 
slightly different approach. In at least one or two early cases of this nature it seems 
as if the courts determined whether inaedificatio had taken place in a manner that 
they deemed fair to the owner of the movable, insofar as the objective factors did not 
exhaustively indicate permanent attachment to the land (the movable could 
reasonably easily be removed) and if ownership of the movable was reserved in the 
contract of sale. These cases do not fit the picture of the so-called traditional 
approach that is usually associated with the older case law. 
Chapter three analyses case law that is usually associated with the so-called 
new approach. The aim of the chapter is to establish whether there was a shift in 
post-1978 case law from the traditional approach towards a so-called new approach 
when deciding whether inaedificatio had occurred. The general view is that the 
approach of the courts after 1978 is new to the extent that it considers the stated or 
actual intention of the owner of the movable as the most significant factor from the 
outset. Academic authors argue that the decisions in Theatre Investments and 
Melcorp indicate such a new approach to accession. Lewis argues explicitly that 
Theatre Investments indicates a change in approach by the Appellate Division and 
contends that this change is in line with the principle that an owner of property 
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cannot be deprived of his property without his agreement. According to Lewis the 
Appellate Division should not deviate from this approach in future. Other academic 
authors also state that post-1978 case law is indicative of the new approach but do 
not necessarily support the rationale behind the new approach, especially since they 
regard the reasons why so much emphasis is placed on the subjective intention as 
doctrinally incorrect.10 
In chapter three I argue that analysis of the post-1978 case law does not really 
support the conclusion that there was a shift to a new approach, since the later 
cases merely continue or, at most, increasingly emphasise the intention of the owner 
or annexor of the movable, particularly in cases where ownership of the movable is 
reserved in a credit sale contract.11 Most importantly, although more emphasis is 
arguably placed on subjective intention in the post-1978 case law, the objective 
factors are not ignored in these cases but relied on to confirm that there was no 
accession. 
However, chapter three does outline a development that can in fact be 
observed in the post-1990 case law. In Konstanz the court held that, to determine 
whether inaedificatio had taken place, one must consider the intention of the owner 
of the movable and not the intention of the annexor. In earlier cases there was some 
confusion about the question whether it is the intention of the annexor or the 
intention of the owner of the movable that is relevant, mostly because they were 
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often in fact the same person. In Konstanz, the court stated explicitly that the 
intention of the owner of the movable is not merely important, but in fact decisive. 
However, the court stated that the decision to regard the intention of the owner of the 
movable as an important element for accession might be reconsidered in the 
future.12 
Chapter three sets out the role of the three factors in the so-called new 
approach. It establishes that the three factors that the so-called traditional approach 
applied in the earlier case law are still applied in more recent cases, and that the 
subjective or stated intention of the owner of the movable still takes priority over the 
other factors in certain (but not all) cases.13 The reason advanced for this approach 
is that an owner could not lose ownership of his property without the intention to 
transfer ownership. However, generally speaking it would be inaccurate to state that 
the newer case law has abandoned the objective factors completely and only focus 
on the stated intention of the owner; such a complete shift apparently remains 
isolated to a few decisions. 
From the analysis of case law in chapter two and three one cannot conclusively 
infer that the courts have abandoned the traditional and adopted a completely new 
approach. The courts mostly still refer to all three factors and consider both objective 
factors and the stated intention of the owner. What is seemingly new in post-1978 
case law is that at least some courts now explicitly focus on the owner of the 
movable’s ipse dixit regarding his intention during attachment. However, the 
tendency to sometimes place more emphasis on the subjective intention is not really 
new to the extent that earlier decisions already followed a similar approach, 
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 See 3 2 2 above. 
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 See 3 2 2 above. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
94 
especially if the objective factors were inconclusive. It is therefore safer to conclude 
that both early and recent cases have always emphasised, more or less strongly, the 
intention of the owner of the movable to determine whether or not accession had 
occurred. Moreover, although it is true that various cases emphasise the stated 
intention of the owner of the movable, this tendency is more common in cases where 
the objective factors were not conclusive that attachment had taken place. The 
cases associated with the so-called new approach do not provide convincing proof 
that courts will, in instances where the objective factors clearly indicate that 
permanent attachment had taken place, override those indications and decide 
against attachment purely based on the stated intention of the owner of the 
movables. For the most part, therefore, it cannot be said that there is sufficient 
evidence of a shift away from the traditional and towards a new approach in the case 
law. 
However, this conclusion must be qualified with reference to one specific set of 
circumstances, both in the older and in the recent case law. It seems that the courts 
will not easily find that accession had taken place in instances where the objective 
factors are inconclusive of permanent attachment and where ownership was 
reserved in the contract of a credit sale of the movables. This approach appears 
from both older cases that are usually associated with the so-called traditional 
approach as well as recent cases associated with the so-called new approach, and 
therefore it cannot be forwarded as proof of the emergence of a general new 
approach. In Macdonald, Melcorp and Konstanz the relevant movables were sold in 
terms of instalment-sale agreements and the parties agreed to reserve ownership of 
the movable as security for payment of the full purchase price. The interests of the 
owners of the movables (who reserved ownership for security purposes) were 
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protected in these cases when it was held that accession had not taken place. In all 
three cases the decision was justified with reference to the fact that the movables 
could be removed from the land with ease. However, it was possible in all these 
cases to argue that the movable formed an integral part of the building, in which 
case the conclusion might have been different. Therefore, one can conclude that a 
movable that is attached to land and that is subject to a security reservation of 
ownership remains movable until the conditions of the reservation of ownership are 
fulfilled, at least inasmuch as that movable is removable with relative ease and 
without causing any damage to the land or itself. 
In conclusion, it does not seem as if there is convincing proof of a substantive 
shift from a so-called traditional approach (in which intention was only referred to if 
the objective factors are inconclusive) to a so-called new approach (in which the 
stated intention of the owner of the movable is determinative of the outcome). At 
most, it can be said that there are signs of such a shift to the extent that some courts 
now seem explicitly to place more emphasis on the stated intention of the owner of 
the movable, sometimes based on the argument that an owner should not lose 
ownership against her will. At the same time, there are some signs (in both older and 
more recent cases) that in a specific set of cases, where ownership of the movable 
had been reserved as security in a credit sale, the courts are more willing to find that 
attachment had not taken place, provided that the movable remains removable with 
relative ease, even in circumstances where the courts might (in the absence of the 
credit sale and the reservation of ownership) otherwise have concluded that 
attachment had taken place. 
Insofar as the observed tendency to protect credit grantors in cases like 
Macdonald, Melcorp and Konstanz prioritizes the subjective, stated intention of the 
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owner of the movables over the objective factors it might be said that there are signs 
of an alternative approach that differs from the traditional approach in the majority of 
cases. However, as was argued above, these indications cannot be said to establish 
proof of a new approach that signifies a general shift away from the traditional 
approach. In the following sections criticism against and justifications for the so-
called new approach are discussed to establish whether the more limited alternative 
approach that was identified here can be justified. 
 
4 3 Criticisms against the so-called new approach 
Case law that is said to be associated with the so-called new approach is criticised 
for the emphasis that it places on the subjective intention of the owner of the 
movable. The greater emphasis that is said to be placed on the intention of the 
owner of the movable in the so-called new approach is criticised for various reasons. 
To the extent that it is concluded in the paragraphs above that there is evidence in 
the case law that the owner’s intention plays a large role in at least some cases 
(even if there is insufficient evidence of a general shift towards the new approach), 
this criticism is relevant for what follows. 
To begin with, placing so much emphasis on the intention of the owner of the 
movable is criticised for confusing the original and derivative modes of acquisition of 
real rights. Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert explain the distinction between the 
original and derivative modes of acquiring real rights.14 This distinction hinges on the 
question whether the acquisition of the movable property “is constituted by unilateral 
or bilateral transaction, that is, whether or not the co-operation of a predecessor in 
                                            
14
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 71-72. 
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title is required”.15 Therefore, acquisition of ownership is original if ownership is not 
derived from any predecessor or if the thing upon which ownership is acquired was 
res nullius. Moreover, according to the rules of original acquisition of ownership, 
consent is not required to acquire ownership.16 Consequently, if inaedificatio occurs, 
ownership of the movable is lost without any regard for the intention of the owner of 
the movable since ownership is not transferred from one person to another, but lost 
by one and incorporated into the property of another by operation of law. The owner 
of the movable cannot base his claim for ownership on the fact that he did not intend 
to transfer his movable property to the owner of the immovable because there is no 
question of transfer of ownership; the former owner of the movable lost ownership by 
operation of law when the movable lost its independent existence and at that point it 
became incorporated into the property of the landowner.17 
Conversely, acquisition of ownership is derivative if ownership of the movable 
property is derived from the previous owner by transfer. A bilateral juridical act is 
required to transfer ownership of the movable to a new owner in terms of derivative 
acquisition of ownership,18 and as a result the intention of the owner of the movable 
will always play a role in cases where the change of ownership is derivative. 
According to Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert, the intention of the owner of the 
movable has been over-emphasised, particularly in the form of direct evidence, in 
accession cases that focus too heavily on the intention of the owner of the movable 
                                            
15
 Unimark Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Erf 94 Silvertondale (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 986 (T) 1000. See also 
PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 2006) 
71-72 137. 
16
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 72. See also A Breitenbach “Reflection on inaedificatio” (1985) 48 THRHR 462-465 463-464. 
17
 See 2 2 above. 
18
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 72. 
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to establish whether accession had taken place.19 The authors argue that the 
emphasis on the intention of the owner has produced unsatisfactory outcomes in 
terms of how it is determined whether inaedificatio had occurred.20 
The emphasis that is placed on the intention of the owner of the movable is 
also criticised for confusing the rules of property with those of contract. Freedman 
argues that the emphasis on intention undermines the principles of property law, 
since it allows the requirements (or rather elements) of contract law to play an 
unwarranted role in inaedificatio, which has nothing to do with consensual transfer of 
property. He maintains that it is important to retain the fundamental distinction 
between the law of property and the law of obligations.21 It seems that the emphasis 
that is placed on intention allows a contractual undertaking to trump proprietary 
rights that were acquired originally.22 Pope argues, somewhat in the same line, that 
placing so much emphasis on the agreement to transfer may distract the courts from 
the core issue, which is whether accession has occurred and not whether the owner 
of the movable intended to transfer ownership in the event of the purchase price 
being paid in full.23 
Finally, the role of the intention of the owner in the new approach does not only 
confuse property law and contract law principles, it also conflicts with the publicity 
                                            
19
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 150. See also I Knobel “Accession of movables to land: South African law and Dutch law” 
(2012) 45 CILSA 77-90 81; JC Sonnekus & JL Neels Sakereg vonnisbundel (2
nd
 ed 1994) 72. 
20
 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar & H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The law of property (5
th
 ed 
2006) 150. 
21
 W Freedman “The test for inaedificatio: What role should the element of subjective intention play?” 
(2000) 117 SALJ 667-676 674. 
22
 DL Carey Miller “Fixtures and auxiliary items: Are recent decisions blurring real rights and personal 
rights?” (1984) 101 SALJ 205-211 207. 
23
 A Pope “Inaedificatio revisited: Looking backwards in search of clarity” (2011) 128 SALJ 123-146 
143. 
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principle.24 According to the publicity principle a real right as well as its contents and 
the identity of its holder should be made known and published to the world at large.25 
Van der Merwe asserts that the principle of publicity attaches greater importance to 
the outward appearance (objective factors) than the intention of the owner of the 
movable who may have reserved ownership prior to attachment.26 Therefore, the 
publicity principle seeks to protect third parties who might hold interests in the land in 
question. To comply with the publicity principle in cases of inaedificatio the 
landowner’s rights to anything that is permanently attached to his land should be 
made known to the public at large.27 This is because third parties are likely to rely on 
the physical appearance that movables are permanently attached to the land and to 
conclude that they form part and parcel of that land. On this basis Van der Merwe 
argues that the so-called new approach undermines the publicity principle in that it 
regards the intention of the owner of the movable as more important than the 
outward appearance created by physical attachment, based on the nature and 
purpose of the movable property and the degree and manner of attachment. 
Consequently, it might prejudice third parties, like prospective mortgagees and 
purchasers, who rely on the outward appearance of attachment of movables to an 
                                            
24
 DL Carey Miller “Fixtures and auxiliary items: Are recent decisions blurring real rights and personal 
rights?” (1984) 101 SALJ 205-211 207; A Breitenbach “Reflection on inaedificatio” (1985) 48 THRHR 
462-465 464. 
25
 DL Carey Miller “Fixtures and auxiliary items: Are recent decisions blurring real rights and personal 
rights?” (1984) 101 SALJ 205-211 207. 
26
 CG van der Merwe “The law of property (including mortgage and pledge)” 1980 ASSAL 230-233 
232-233. 
27
 W Freedman “The test for inaedificatio: What role should the element of subjective intention play?” 
(2000) 117 SALJ 667-676 673-674; CG van der Merwe “The law of property (including mortgage and 
pledge)” 1980 ASSAL 230-233 232-233. 
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immovable, and who are likely to assume that everything attached to an immovable 
forms part of it and belongs to the landowner.28 
From the analysis above, it is clear that the majority of academic commentators 
are of the view that the intention of the owner of the movable should not play a 
conclusive role in determining whether accession had taken place. The main reason 
for their view is that accession is a form of original acquisition of ownership and 
therefore does not require the intention of the owner of the movable to transfer 
ownership. 
This criticism is correct but even though the courts sometimes consider the 
intention of the owner of the movable as the most important factor, in fact the 
objective factors were not conclusive of accession in the relevant cases, which – in 
my view – are therefore not necessarily in conflict with the basic principles of 
accession. According to the inaedificatio principles, movable structures that have 
been permanently attached to land cease to exist as independent things and 
become part of the immovable object to which they are attached.29 Therefore, if the 
independent identity of a movable is not lost and the movable is still easily 
removable from the land, it is not necessarily clear from the objective factors that 
accession had indeed taken place. To consider the subjective intention of the 
annexor in cases of that nature is therefore not necessarily confusing original with 
derivative acquisition of property, unless what the court does in fact (as one or two 
decisions indeed suggest) is to emphasize the owner’s intention not to transfer 
ownership instead of the annexor’s intention not to attach permanently. It is only the 
                                            
28
 W Freedman “The test for inaedificatio: What role should the element of subjective intention play?” 
(2000) 117 SALJ 667-676 673-674. See also in CG van der Merwe “The law of property (including 
mortgage and pledge)” 1980 ASSAL 230-233 232-233. 
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 See 2 2 above. 
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decisions (and academic views) that rely on the owner of the movable’s intention to 
transfer ownership as a factor that indeed confuse the two methods of acquisition 
and that should therefore be rejected. 
However, it also has to be said that the courts do sometimes conclude too 
easily that the objective factors are inconclusive. In some cases the manner and 
degree of attachment is not decisive of accession (for example when the movable 
can be removed with relative ease) but the nature and object of the movable should 
indicate (objectively) that the movable was intended to be permanently attached to 
the land, even though it might physically be removable with relative ease. This is 
especially the case where the movable becomes an integral part of the immovable 
property, such as the lifts in Melcorp. In these cases, although the manner and 
degree of attachment might not be decisive of accession, one could probably argue 
that the other objective factor (nature and object of the movable) indicates the 
objective intention to attach the movable permanently, which implies that the 
subjective or stated intention should not necessarily be as important. 
However, it seems as if reservation of ownership for security in a contract of 
credit sale of the movable more or less consistently distracts the courts from 
considering the objective factors with sufficient clarity. Hence, the courts tend to 
protect the interests of the owner of the movable probably to ensure equity and 
fairness in the event where ownership was reserved and the purchase price has not 
been paid in full, by finding that the movable is removable and therefore did not 
become attached to the land permanently. Therefore, one could conclude that, in 
these cases, the true reason for a finding that accession had not taken place might 
be a policy decision to protect security interests in credit transactions and not the fact 
that the movable is removable and that it therefore had not become attached 
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permanently. If policy indeed plays such an important role in the few cases that could 
arguably have gone either way but were decided in the way that best protects 
security interests, it becomes important to consider the role of policy considerations 
in attachment cases. 
 
4 4 Justifications for protecting the interests of the former owner of the 
movable 
As was indicated above, a few cases indicate that movables that are attached to 
land subject to a reservation of ownership agreement (in the contract of a credit sale 
of the movable) would not become permanently attached to the land until the terms 
of agreement are honoured, provided that it can be shown that the movable can be 
removed with relative ease. The decisions of Macdonald, Melcorp and Konstanz, 
which concerned such sales of movables subject to reservation of ownership, 
indicate that the stated intention of the owner of the movable (as stated in the 
contract of credit sale) is important to determine whether or not inaedificatio had 
occurred. In the aforementioned cases the presence of a hire-purchase agreement 
led the courts to regard the intention of the owner of the movable (who in some 
cases was the annexor) as the most decisive factor in determining whether 
accession had taken place.30 It must be emphasized that these decisions were 
possible because it was possible to remove the movable with relative ease. 
In Macdonald Innes CJ stated that “the intention required (in conjunction with 
annexation) to destroy the identity, to merge the title, or to transfer the dominium of 
movable property, must surely be the intention of the owner”.31 According to the 
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 See 4 2 above. 
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 Macdonald Ltd v Radin NO and The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 467. 
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court, consideration of the intention of the owner of the movable is what is expected 
in view of the fundamental principle that a non-owner cannot transfer the property of 
another. The majority view was that, since the owner of the movable was not paid in 
full, he is regarded to have not intended to give up ownership. The majority view was 
sustained by the fact that it was not difficult to remove the machinery in question 
from the land. One can conclude that the court in Macdonald refused to accept that 
accession had taken place and elected instead to enforce a debt that was owed to 
the owner of the machine under a hire-purchase agreement, which reserved 
ownership of the machine. 
Similarly, in Melcorp the court placed considerable weight on the annexor’s ipse 
dixit (as stated in the hire-purchase contract) to arrive at the conclusion that the lifts 
remained movable until the purchase price was fully paid. Since the lifts were readily 
removable from the buildings (coupled with the fact that ownership of the lifts was 
reserved) the court in Melcorp held that the lifts remained movable.32 The court 
refused to accept that accession had taken place and instead enforced the debt that 
was owed to the owner of the lifts under the hire-purchase contract, which reserved 
ownership of the lifts as a security for payment of the full purchase price. Since the 
lifts were readily removable the court decided that accession had not occurred, 
despite the fact that the nature and object of the lifts indicated that the lifts were 
intended to be installed permanently in the building. 
In Konstanz the court went even further and stated that the intention of the 
owner of the movable is not merely important, but in fact decisive. The court held 
that inaedificatio had not occurred because the hire-purchase contract indicated 
clearly that the respondent would remain the owner of the irrigation system until 
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payment in full of the purchase price.33 The court’s finding that the irrigation system 
did not become part of the land through inaedificatio also protected the interests of 
the owner of the movables who reserved ownership as security for full payment of 
the purchase price. 
The question is whether it is desirable to rely so heavily on the stated or actual 
intention of the owner of the movable when determining whether accession had 
taken place in cases of credit sales. The courts justify their reliance on the intention 
of the owner of the movable in these cases by explicitly stating that an owner of a 
movable should not be deprived of ownership without his consent.34 However, since 
it is evident from case law that the movable would form part of the land if the 
purchase price had been paid in full, one can argue that the real justification of the 
courts’ reliance on the intention of the owner of the movable is commercial policy, 
namely to protect the real security interest. 
It seems that a decision that accession had not occurred in cases where the 
transfer of ownership of the movable is reserved subject to payment of the full 
purchase price, is presumably a decision in favour of enforcing contractual debts in 
credit sales. Effective enforcement of contractual debts is said to be vital for the 
proper functioning of any market based system.35 Therefore, a finding that accession 
had not occurred after having had regard to the intention of the owner of the movable 
in the contract of sale would arguably promote the social and commercial stability of 
society. A finding that attachment is not permanent may provide security for 
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 See 3 2 2 above. 
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 Macdonald Ltd v Radin NO and The Potchefstroom Dairies & Industries Co Ltd 1915 AD 454 467. 
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 R Brits Mortgage foreclosure under the Constitution: Property, housing and the National Credit Act 
(2012) unpublished LLD dissertation Stellenbosch University 316. 
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commercial transactions and ensures that the interests of creditors who reserve 
ownership of the movable as security are protected. 
Therefore, if it is decided that accession is suspended by a reservation of 
ownership for credit security the landowner should either pay the amount due for 
purchase of the movable or allow the seller to remove the movable from the land. 
This is – in my view – an effective way of debt enforcement as long as the movable 
is still reasonably easily removable from the land. Therefore, a court order to allow 
removal of the movable from the land to enforce the purchase price that is due to the 
owner of the movable, presumably for commercial policy reasons, is justifiable at 
least insofar as the movable is in fact easily removable from the land without causing 
damage. If this policy consideration is indeed the true reason for deciding that 
accession had not taken place in certain cases, it is doubtful whether courts would 
be willing to question the wisdom of the policy considerations. 
 
4 5 Constitutional implications 
4 5 1 Introduction 
As indicated in 4 4, there seems to be a valid reason for considering the intention of 
the owner of the movable important to determine whether accession had taken place 
in certain attachment cases, particularly in instances where ownership of the 
movable had been reserved in a contract of credit sale. However, decisions about 
accession should also be grounded in a constitutionally sound approach.36 
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 A Pope “Inaedificatio revisited: Looking backwards in search of clarity” (2011) 128 SALJ 123-146 
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This section examines whether a decision that accession had taken place, or a 
decision that it had not taken place in specified circumstances for policy reasons, 
constitutes a deprivation of property in view of section 25 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996. Section 25(1) of the Constitution states that no one 
may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law 
may permit arbitrary deprivation. Therefore, a decision either that accession had 
taken place or that it had not taken place (to protect ownership of the movable the 
ownership of which had been reserved for security reasons) must be compatible with 
the constitutional prohibition against arbitrary deprivation of property.37 
In light of section 25(1) that protects owners against arbitrary deprivation of 
property, together with the methodology laid down by the Constitutional Court in First 
National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue 
Service and Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of 
Finance38 (“FNB”), the following section investigates whether a decision either for or 
against accession (the latter for policy reasons) has any constitutional implications. 
 
4 5 2 Structure, purpose and application of section 25 
Section 25(1) contains two formal requirements for deprivation of property, namely 
that the deprivation of property must be in terms of law of general application and no 
law may permit arbitrary deprivation.39 The “law of general application” requirement 
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 A Pope “Inaedificatio revisited: Looking backwards in search of clarity” (2011) 128 SALJ 123-146 
125 argues that “at all times … compatibility with the constitutional prohibition against arbitrary 
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ensures that deprivation of property cannot take place without “proper authority”.40 If 
a deprivation is not authorised by law of general application, it is invalid and 
unconstitutional. Consequently, it would be unnecessary for courts to test whether 
such law constitutes arbitrary deprivation. Moreover, the validity of a deprivation is 
dependent on the law of general application that authorises it and not a particular act 
of deprivation.41 Therefore, an individual who intends to institute a constitutional 
property challenge could challenge the law that permits the deprivation.42 The courts 
must inquire whether the law validly authorises the deprivation that is challenged. In 
decisions outside of property law it has been established that the common law is law 
of general application.43 The common law rules that regulate accession therefore 
qualify as law of general application for purposes of section 25(1) and therefore the 
first requirement would usually be met whenever a decision about accession was 
based on the common law principles.44 
Questions may arise regarding the application of section 25 to disputes that 
involve private parties.45 For instance, in a case of inaedificatio, where ownership of 
the attached movable is disputed, the question is whether section 25(1) can apply 
directly to resolve the dispute surrounding inaedificatio, which is a dispute between 
private parties and that is purely governed by common law. 
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 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
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 ed 2011) 237. 
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Section 8(1) of the Constitution provides that the Bill of Rights applies to all law 
and it binds the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. This section provides for 
the direct vertical application of the Bill of Rights. Section 8(2) of the Constitution 
provides that the Bill of Rights also applies between private individuals. This section 
provides for horizontal application, which can be either direct or indirect.46 Direct 
horizontal application involves direct reliance on a provision in the Bill of Rights for a 
cause of action or defence against another private person.47 In a case of 
inaedificatio, direct horizontal application would mean that an owner of a land may 
want to rely on section 25 as a cause of action or defence against a claim for a 
removal of a movable, which ostensibly was attached to land. 
In the case of indirect horizontal application, Van der Walt states that the cause 
of action or defence relies on the Constitution in such a way that the private law rules 
(statutory or common law) that govern the dispute are open to amendment or 
influence from the Constitution, even though a state threat against either party is not 
directly in issue.48 Applied to a case of inaedificatio this means that an owner of land 
may want to challenge the existing legal rules that permit the deprivation of property 
or their interpretation and application, instead of directly challenging the action of the 
owner of the movable. This kind of application (indirect horizontal application) is 
governed by section 39(2) of the Constitution, which provides that: 
“When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bill of Rights”. 
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This implies that when the courts apply statutory or common law that permits 
deprivation of property, they must do so in a manner that promotes the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights, which includes section 25. Considering this analysis, 
it seems that indirect horizontal application would be possible in resolving disputes 
between private parties regarding the common law regarding inaedificatio. 
Therefore, courts may apply or develop legal rules that regulate whether or not 
inaedificatio had occurred in the event of dispute, but this must occur in line with 
section 25 of the Constitution. 
 
4 5 3 FNB methodology 
According to the two-stage approach that is followed by the Constitutional Court in 
constitutional litigation, litigants who claim protection under a provision in the Bill of 
Rights must – in the first stage – show that they are beneficiaries of a right in the Bill 
of Rights.49 Moreover, the beneficiaries must show that the right in question has 
been limited or infringed. In the second stage, a party who bears the onus of proof 
must be afforded an opportunity to prove that the infringement in question is justified 
under the limitation provision in section 36(1) of the Constitution.50 
This approach will also be followed in a constitutional property dispute.51 The 
applicant in a constitutional property challenge will have to prove in the first stage 
that his property right, which is protected in section 25, has been infringed upon. In 
the second stage the state or the party who relies on the validity of the act will have 
to prove that the infringement of the applicant’s existing property right can be justified 
                                            
49
 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paras 100-102. See also AJ van der Walt 
Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 74-75; T Roux “Property” in S Woolman et al (eds) 
Constitutional law of South Africa vol 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 2003) 46-3. 
50
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 75. 
51
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 75. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
110 
in terms of section 36(1). However, the Constitutional Court in FNB further 
developed the two-stage approach and laid down a methodology that generally 
proceeds in a set of steps for conducting constitutional property disputes.52 Roux 
lists the steps as follows: 
“(a) Does that which is taken away from [the property holder] by the operation of 
[the law in question] amount to property for purpose of s 25? 
(b) Has there been a deprivation of such property by the [organ of state 
concerned]? 
(c) If there has, is such deprivation consistent with the provisions of s 25(1)? 
(d) If not, is such deprivation justified under s 36 of the Constitution? 
(e) If it is, does it amount to expropriation for purpose of s 25(2)? 
(f) If so, does the [expropriation] comply with the requirements of s 25(2)(a) and 
(b)? 
(g) If not, is the expropriation justified under s 36?”53 
The starting point of any constitutional challenge is section 25(1). Accordingly, step 
(a) questions whether the interest that is affected qualifies as property in terms of 
section 25(1).54 If the answer is in the affirmative, step (b) questions whether there 
has been deprivation of property.55 If there is deprivation present, step (c) questions 
whether such a deprivation is in line with the provisions of section 25(1).56 If the 
deprivation is consistent with the provisions of section 25(1), the inquiry proceeds to 
                                            
52
 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law (3
rd
 ed 2011) 75. 
53
 T Roux “Property” in S Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional law of South Africa vol 3 (2
nd
 ed OS 
2003) 46-3. 
54
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
46(a). 
55
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
46(b). 
56
 First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and 
Another; First National Bank of SA Ltd t/a Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) para 
46(c). 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
111 
step (e). However, if the deprivation is not consistent with section 25(1), step (d) 
inquires whether such a deprivation can be justified under section 36 of the 
Constitution.57 If the deprivation in question cannot be justified under section 36, the 
inquiry ends there and the law that permits the deprivation would be declared invalid 
and unconstitutional. If the deprivation in question did comply with section 25(1) or 
can be justified under section 36, step (e) asks whether the deprivation also amounts 
to expropriation in terms of section 25(2).58 If it does, step (f) questions whether such 
expropriation complies with section 25(2)(a) and (b).59 If the expropriation does not 
comply with section 25(2), step (g) asks whether such expropriation can be justified 
under section 36(1).60 If the expropriation cannot be justified under section 36, the 
expropriation would be invalid and unconstitutional. 
Roux argues that the FNB decision has added greater clarity in terms of how 
section 25 should be interpreted to achieve the goal of balancing private and public 
interests in property.61 Van der Walt also argues that the decision in FNB has 
terminated a number of uncertainties and debates concerning the interpretation of 
section 25(1) of the Constitution and has for the first time brought clarity about the 
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approach to be followed when the property clause is interpreted.62 However, Roux 
argues that the arbitrariness test dominates the whole constitutional property inquiry. 
Van der Walt agrees with Roux and argues that all cases that concern constitutional 
property disputes and that follow the FNB methodology are likely to get stuck in the 
section 25(1) arbitrariness analysis and end there.63 
Nonetheless, from the analysis above, it seems that the FNB methodology is 
necessary to determine whether the deprivation of property meets the requirements 
of section 25(1). In the next section I apply the FNB methodology to determine 
whether a decision by the court to the effect that accession had either occurred or 
been suspended for policy reasons constitutes a deprivation of property in terms of 
section 25(1). 
 
4 5 4 Accession decisions in view of the FNB methodology 
4 5 2 1 Is there “property” in terms of section 25? 
Before asking whether any interference with property interests amounts to arbitrary 
deprivation, the first question – in terms of FNB methodology indicated above – is 
whether the interest that is affected qualifies as property for constitutional purposes. 
Section 25(4)(b) of the Constitution provides that property is not limited to land. 
Moreover, the Constitutional Court in FNB confirmed that corporeal movables and 
land are at the heart of the constitutional concept of property and must in principle be 
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protected under section 25.64 Van der Walt explains the meaning of property in terms 
of section 25: 
“For purposes of section 25 ‘property’ can therefore relate to a wide range of 
objects both corporeal and incorporeal, a wide range of traditional property rights 
and interests both real and personal, and a wide range of other rights and 
interests which (in civil-law tradition) have never been considered in terms of 
property before.”
65
 
According to the sources referred to above, property may in terms of section 25 
encompass a range of rights, object and interests in property.66 In the case of 
accession, it is clear from the preceding explanation of property that the ownership of 
movables that may cease to exist as independent objects if they become 
permanently attached to land by building clearly falls within the scope of “property” 
for the purposes of section 25 of the Constitution. The property interest that is almost 
always involved in attachment cases is ownership of movables, and the FNB 
decision makes it clear that both the object (tangible movable objects) and the right 
(ownership) involved in such cases qualify as property for section 25 purposes. 
In attachment cases it needs to be determined which property interests are lost 
when the court decides whether or not accession had occurred. In a “normal” 
accession case where the court decides that accession had indeed occurred, the 
owner of the movable loses ownership of the property that has ceased to exist 
independently and become permanently attached to land as a result of accession. In 
Theatre Investment, the court did not allow the lessee to remove certain seats, 
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emergency lighting and dimmer-board because they had become attached to the 
immovable property permanently. Accordingly, the lessee lost the ownership of his 
property, which now formed part of the land of the lessor by accession. In this case 
the lessee can have a section 25(1) claim because the movables that it owned 
ceased to exist when they became permanently attached to the land of the lessor, 
with the result that the lessee lost ownership by operation of law. The lessee was 
thus deprived of its property by the operation of the common law rules of accession. 
The lessee will be able to prove that it had a property interest (ownership of the 
movables) of which it was deprived by operation of law. 
However, this may be different in a case where the court decides that 
accession had not occurred, for instance because ownership of the movable was 
reserved in the contract of credit sale. In Melcorp the court held that certain lifts did 
not become part of the building through accession and that they remained movable. 
This was probably inspired by the fact that the ownership of the lifts was reserved in 
the contract of credit sale by the seller/owner, combined with the fact that they were 
reasonably easily removable. The owner of the building could not claim ownership of 
the lifts because they never became his property. Therefore, in a case such as 
Melcorp there is no party who can have a section 25(1) claim: the owner of the lifts 
still owns his lifts and will have nothing to claim. Conversely, the landowner never 
acquired ownership of the lifts because they had not become attached to the building 
and therefore the landowner has no property interest for the purposes of section 
25(1). 
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4 5 2 2 Has there been a deprivation of property? 
Once it has been established that the interest affected is property in terms of section 
25, the next question is whether there has been deprivation of that property that 
triggers a section 25(1) inquiry. In FNB the court interpreted “deprivation” widely to 
mean: 
“Any interference with the use, enjoyment or exploitation of private property 
involves some deprivation in respect of the person having title or right to or in the 
property concerned”.67 
According to Van der Walt,68 the apparent clarity that the FNB decision brought 
regarding the meaning of deprivation was “clouded” by a subsequent decision of the 
Constitutional Court in Mkontwana v Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality; 
Bissett and Others v Buffalo City Municipality; Transfer Rights Action Campaign and 
Others v Member of Executive Council for Local Government and Housing, Gauteng 
and Others69 (“Mkontwana”). In Mkontwana the Court stated that the question 
whether there has been a deprivation “depends on the extent of the interference or 
limitation on the use, enjoyment or exploitation” and “substantial interference or 
limitation that goes beyond the normal restrictions on property use or enjoyment 
found in an open and democratic society”.70 
Van der Walt criticises the definition of deprivation in Mkontwana and argues 
that the court restricted its FNB definition of deprivation without clearly explaining the 
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differences between the two definitions.71 He argues that the definition in Mkontwana 
was made subject to a disclaimer and should be carefully approached because it is 
problematic. According to Van der Walt “it is unclear why the definition of deprivation 
should be linked to the notion of what is normal in an open democracy”.72 
The approach to the definition of deprivation in Mkontwana was not followed in 
the subsequent case of Reflect-All 1025 CC and Others v MEC for Public Transport, 
Roads and Works, Gauteng Provincial Government, and Another73 (“Reflect-All”). 
The Constitutional Court in Reflect-All followed the wider FNB definition of 
deprivation rather than the narrow Mkontwana definition.74 The Constitutional Court 
in Offit Enterprises (Pty) Ltd and Another v COEGA Development Corporation (Pty) 
Ltd and Others75 is said to have increased the confusion by stating that it would 
follow the Mkontwana definition of deprivation, but in fact it applied the original, wider 
FNB test.76 Accordingly, there seems to be uncertainty in regard to the meaning of 
deprivation. However, Van der Walt defines deprivation as any uncompensated, 
regulatory restriction on the use, enjoyment and exploitation of property.77 This 
definition seems to be in line with the wider FNB definition of deprivation. 
The next question is whether there has been deprivation of property if the court 
decides either that accession has occurred or that it has not occurred in a case 
where the movable is subject to a credit sale with reservation of ownership. In the 
former instance (a “normal” accession case), the owner of the movable can prove a 
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deprivation of his property because he lost ownership when his movables ceased to 
exist as a result of permanently acceding to the land. In Unimark the court held that a 
certain canopy, steel gates, kitchen sink and floor tiles had become immovable as a 
result of accession. In this case, deprivation can be proved because the owner of the 
attached movables lost ownership of the movables that became permanently 
attached to the land, while the owner of the land now owns everything that is 
permanently attached to his land by accession. Therefore, it is clear in this case that 
the rules of accession deprived the owner of his movables. If accession did in fact 
take place, the former owner of the movables can therefore prove both that he had a 
property interest (ownership of movables) and that he was deprived of that property 
by the common law rules of accession. 
In the instance where the court decides that accession had not occurred, for 
instance because the movable is subject to a credit sale with reservation of 
ownership, the owner of the land cannot prove that he had been deprived of 
property. The movable property never becomes the property of the landowner in 
these cases and still belongs to the original owner. If accession had not taken place, 
the landowner never owned anything that he could have been deprived of. In 
Melcorp the court held that certain lifts remained movable and were not permanently 
attached to the building by accession. In this case, the court made it clear that if the 
lifts were not readily removable the finding would have been different. This implies 
that if the lifts were not easily removable from the building the court might have found 
that inaedificatio had taken place, and that the lifts accordingly formed part of the 
building. However, since the court decided that accession had in fact not taken place 
the owner of the building never became the owner of the lifts through inaedificatio. In 
this case the owner of the land cannot prove deprivation either. 
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It therefore seems that the constitutional issue of a deprivation of property can 
only be raised in “normal” accession cases, where the objective factors indicate that 
permanent attachment of a movable to land had occurred and that ownership of 
those movables had been lost by operation of law. Therefore, in “normal” accession 
cases, once it has been established that there was accession and that a deprivation 
of property had taken place, step (c) in the FNB methodology is to ask whether the 
deprivation of property that had taken place in terms of the principles of accession is 
in line with section 25(1). Section 25(1) of the Constitution states that no one may be 
deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may 
permit arbitrary deprivation. This section contains two formal requirements for the 
deprivation of property. Firstly, the deprivation of property must be in terms of law of 
general application which is satisfied by the principles of the common law.78 The 
second formal requirement in section 25(1) provides that no law may permit arbitrary 
deprivation of property. According to Van der Walt it is difficult but not impossible to 
prove that a deprivation authorised by common law rules constitutes arbitrary 
deprivation.79 Nonetheless, in a case of inaedificatio the rules that regulate 
accession may in principle not permit deprivation of property that is arbitrary. In 
accordance with the conclusions in the preceding paragraphs, this analysis will only 
arise in the “normal” accession cases, where it has been established that accession 
did take place and that the former owner of the movables had lost ownership when 
the movables became permanently attached to land and thus lost their independent 
existence as objects of property rights. 
According to the Court in FNB deprivation is arbitrary if the law that authorises 
the deprivation does not provide sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in 
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question or is procedurally unfair.80 If there are sufficient reasons for the deprivation 
in terms of the guidelines set out by the court in FNB, the authorising law would not 
constitute arbitrary deprivation in terms of section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
Therefore, if the court decides that a movable no longer exists independently 
because accession had occurred and that its removal from the land would cause 
damage to the land or the movable, that seems to be sufficient reason for holding 
that the deprivation was not arbitrary. Moreover, in most cases where the loss of 
ownership of the movables might seem unfair the former owner of the movable will 
possibly have an action for compensation based on an unjustified enrichment 
against the owner of the land.81 On this basis, a deprivation in the form of loss of 
ownership of a movable that has become permanently attached to land would 
generally not be arbitrary if the court holds that accession had occurred. Generally 
speaking, the reasons why a court would hold that accession had taken place would 
be sufficient to ensure that the deprivation is not arbitrary for purposes of section 
25(1). 
As was argued above, this issue does not arise when the court decides, for 
policy reasons, that permanent attachment had not taken place because the property 
is reasonably easily removable and because ownership of the movable had been 
reserved in a credit sale. In such a case the landowner does not have a section 
25(1) ground for an attack on the court’s decision that accession had not taken 
place. Insofar as there is evidence of a new or a different approach to accession in 
certain cases, particularly where ownership of the movables had been reserved as 
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security, the owner of the land does not have a section 25(1) arbitrariness-based 
remedy against the courts’ application of the accession principles because in these 
cases the very principles themselves determine that the landowner does not acquire 
a property interest that qualifies for protection in terms of section 25. 
However, it might be possible that the landowner in such a case could attack 
the court’s decision, and with it the particular policy-driven interpretation of the 
common law principles of accession in credit sale cases, on the basis of section 9 of 
the Constitution. Section 9 of the Constitution provides that everyone is equal before 
the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law. Therefore, if the 
courts’ interpretation of the rules of common law when deciding whether inaedificatio 
had occurred results in an unequal treatment between the owner of the land in some 
cases (ownership of the movable was reserved for security in a credit sale) and a 
similarly placed landowner in other cases that look exactly the same but for one 
aspect (there is no reservation of ownership), such interpretation may be attacked on 
the grounds of section 9 of the Constitution for unfairly discriminating against the 
owner of the land.82 In that instance the landowner would have to prove the 
requirements for unfair discrimination. However, the outcome of the discrimination 
case might be affected by the fact that the landowner has another remedy, for 
example that the original owner of the movable may be estopped from sustaining his 
reservation of ownership against the innocent purchaser (the landowner). 
 
                                            
82
 Harksen v Lane 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 53. See also I Currie & J De Waal The Bill of Rights 
handbook (5
th
 ed 2005) 235; I Currie & J De Waal The new constitutional and administrative law vol 1 
(2001) 350. 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
121 
4 5 2 3 Was there an expropriation? 
The question whether accession results in expropriation in terms of step (e) of the 
FNB methodology would not arise in a case of accession. This is because there is no 
common law authority for expropriation under South African law. The authority to 
expropriate is said to be derived exclusively from statutory authority.83 In building 
encroachment cases, it has been argued that the common law rules that allow the 
courts to leave the encroaching structures in place or to order that the encroached-
upon land should be transferred to the encroacher, do not qualify as expropriation for 
the same reason.84 The same applies to the enforcement of the common law right of 
a way of necessity. Enforcing the common law regarding the right of way of 
necessity by a court order does not amount to expropriation under South African 
law.85 Therefore, it seems that loss of property by operation of the rules of common 
law would generally not qualify as expropriation in South African law. If property is 
therefore compulsorily “transferred” from one person to another by operation of law 
in terms of a common law principle such as the rules of accession, that “transfer” 
does not qualify as an expropriation that activates section 25(2) or 25(3). 
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4 6 Conclusion 
The main object of this chapter is to discuss and assess the implications of this 
thesis regarding the so-called new approach to accession by building, which 
considers the stated intention of the owner of the movable as the most important 
factor when determining whether accession had taken place. Section 4 2 
summarises the conclusions from the previous chapters. The section concludes that 
both early and recent cases have emphasised the intention of the owner of the 
movable to determine whether or not accession had occurred. Moreover, although it 
is true that various cases emphasise the stated intention of the owner of the 
movable, the objective factors have never been abandoned in the recent cases and 
in cases where the intention is emphasised more heavily, the objective factors are 
not really conclusive. 
Perhaps the most important conclusion in this section is that there are a small 
number of important decisions, both from the earlier cases usually associated with 
the so-called traditional approach and from the recent cases associated with the so-
called new approach, where the courts seem to explicitly rely on the relative ease 
with which the movables can be removed to conclude that attachment had not taken 
place, even though the movables might seem to have become an integral part of the 
land or the immovable structure on it. What seems to set these cases apart is the 
fact that they involve situations where the movables are subject to a credit sale in 
which the owner reserved ownership as security. It seems as if the courts are willing 
to uphold that security right as far as the flexible principles of attachment allow, 
especially by focusing on the removability aspect. Therefore, since it is true that the 
movables in all these cases were in fact capable of removal, it is difficult to reach any 
firm conclusions to this effect. 
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In section 4 3 the chapter discusses criticisms against case law that is 
associated with the new approach. The criticisms are mainly directed at the 
emphasis that various cases in the so-called new approach place on the intention of 
the owner of the movable when determining whether accession had taken place. 
Academic commentators criticise the role that intention plays in these cases because 
accession is a form of original acquisition of ownership and not derivative acquisition, 
which requires intention to transfer ownership. Moreover, the role of intention in the 
so-called new approach is criticised for confusing the rules of contract with those of 
property. The emphasis that the so-called new approach places on the intention is 
also criticised for conflicting with the publicity principle, which ensures that a real 
right as well as its contents and the identity of its holder should be made known and 
published to the world at large. 
I argue in section 4 3 that criticism against the greater emphasis on subjective 
intention is correct, but point out that even though the courts sometimes consider the 
intention of the owner of the movable as the most important factor, the objective 
factors are not conclusive of accession in those cases in any event. According to the 
inaedificatio principles, movable structures that have been permanently attached to 
land cease to exist as independent things and become part of the immovable object 
to which they are attached. Therefore, if the independent identity of a movable is not 
lost or if the movable is still removable with ease, it is unnecessary to see the courts’ 
increased reliance on the intention of the owner of the movable as an indication that 
the court either abandoned the objective factors or shifted to a whole new approach. 
However, I also point out that there are a few recent decisions that follow what 
appears to be a new approach to the extent that they explicitly focus on the intention 
of the owner of the movable, as opposed to the intention of the annexor, and that 
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they explicitly justify this focus with an appeal to the principle that an owner should 
not lose ownership against his will. These decisions are open to the academic 
criticism already mentioned. 
Section 4 4 discusses justifications for the courts’ apparent willingness to 
uphold security rights created by reservation of ownership of the movables. The 
section focuses on the decisions in Macdonald, Melcorp and Konstanz. In these 
cases the courts seemed to justify their reliance on the intention of the owner of the 
movable by explicitly stating that an owner of a movable should not be deprived of 
ownership without his consent. It also appears that this approach might be justified 
by commercial policy reasons. This is because in the event where accession does 
take place the owner of the movable loses not only ownership but a significant real 
security interest that is important to commercial transactions and economic stability. I 
argue that if the courts hold that accession is suspended in these cases it might be 
an effective way of debt enforcement, as long as the movable is in fact still 
removable, which prevents a complete abandonment of the accession principles. 
In section 4 5 above I assess the constitutional implications for deciding that 
accession had either occurred or that it had been suspended by a reservation of 
ownership. In this section I discuss the structure, purpose and application of section 
25 of the Constitution and the FNB methodology that is to be followed when dealing 
with a constitutional property challenge in terms of section 25. In section 4 5 2 1 I ask 
– in terms of the first step in FNB methodology - whether there is property for 
purposes of section 25(1). The section indicates that the property interest involved in 
attachment cases is ownership of the movables, which qualifies as property for 
section 25 purposes. The section also describes the interests that are affected when 
the court decides a “normal” accession case and a case where accession had not 
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occurred, for example because ownership was reserved in a credit sale. In the 
former instance, the owner of the movable loses ownership of the property that has 
become permanently attached to land as a result of accession while in the latter 
instance no loss or acquisition of property interests is involved because the affected 
landowner does not acquire any property for purposes of section 25(1). The 
landowner never acquired ownership of the movable property that was not attached 
to the land and therefore has no property interest to protect. 
Section 4 5 2 2 asks whether there is deprivation of property if the court 
decides either that accession has occurred or that it has not occurred in a case 
where the movable is subject to a credit sale with reservation of ownership. After an 
analysis of what constitutes deprivation for the purposes of section 25, section 4 5 2 
2 indicates that an owner of the movable can prove deprivation of property in a 
“normal” case of accession, where it is decided that accession had indeed taken 
place. The section also indicates that a landowner cannot prove deprivation of 
property in a case where it is held that accession had not taken place, for example 
when a movable is subject to a credit sale with reservation of ownership. This is 
because the land owned by the landowner never included the movable through 
inaedificatio and was therefore never deprived of any property interest. I conclude in 
this section that deprivation will only occur in a “normal” case of accession where the 
objective factors indicate permanent attachment of a movable to land and the owner 
of the movable can no longer claim ownership thereof. Accordingly, the question 
whether the deprivation amounts to arbitrary deprivation of property also only arises 
in the cases where accession did in fact occur. 
Deprivation is arbitrary if the law that authorises the deprivation does not 
provide sufficient reason for the particular deprivation in question or is procedurally 
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unfair. Therefore, if the court decides that a movable no longer exists independently 
because accession had occurred and that its removal from the land would cause 
damage to the land or the movable, that seems to be sufficient reason for holding 
that the deprivation was not arbitrary. On this basis I conclude that a deprivation in 
the form of loss of ownership of a movable that has become permanently attached to 
land would generally not be arbitrary if the court holds that accession had occurred. 
In section 4 5 2 3 I ask whether the deprivation that is not arbitrary amounts to 
expropriation. The section concludes that loss of ownership by operation of law in 
terms of a common law principle such as the rules of accession does not qualify as 
an expropriation that activates section 25(2) or 25(3). This is because loss of 
property by operation of the rules of common law does not generally qualify as 
expropriation in South African law. 
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